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A was tried and acquitted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. It
was alleged that he had conspired with B and C to sell cocaine in
Chicago in December of 1993.
A is now charged with conspiracy to sell cocaine in Chicago and
Milwaukee. His alleged co-conspirators are D and E, and their con-
spiracy is alleged to have occurred in April of 1993.
A wishes to plead double jeopardy. Is this a good plea? Who de-
cides-judge or jury? When is the plea raised and when is it re-
solved? What is the test of double jeopardy? What is the standard
of proof?
HE Supreme Court has given little guidance on these issues.
Although in the last twenty years the high court has considered
the Double Jeopardy Clause1 in numerous cases, 2 its opinions
*Adjunct Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; J.D., Northwestern
University; J.S.D., Columbia University.
1. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
"nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Double jeopardy protection is also available to defendants
in state court prosecutions because the Fourteenth Amendment to the United. States Con-
stitution incorporates the protections found in the Fifth Amendment and makes those pro-
tections fully applicable to state court prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
The Court has repeatedly held, however, despite persistent criticism, e.g., Daniel A.
Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age
of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1992), that under the "dual sovereignty
doctrine" it is permissible to prosecute an individual in state court and then to bring a
prosecution for the same conduct in federal court and vice versa. E.g., Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1959); cf. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87 (1985) (holding succes-
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have not focused on the unique problems raised by the double jeopardy
plea in successive conspiracy prosecutions. The lower courts have de-
cided a number of cases raising these issues, but their opinions have not
evolved clear rules or even a clear approach.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The double jeopardy cases deal with two basic situations. In the first,
the question is whether the defendant may be prosecuted in separate pro-
ceedings under separate statutes and receive multiple punishments for
what seems a single incident or course of conduct. For example, if a de-
fendant conspires to sell drugs and actually sells drugs on a particular
occasion, may he be prosecuted twice, once for the conspiracy, and once
for the sale? Current law says he may be prosecuted twice. 3 In the sec-
ond situation, the question is whether the defendant may be prosecuted
more than once and receive multiple punishments under the same statute
for what seems a single incident or course of conduct. For example, if a
defendant sells drugs to A and then sells drugs to B minutes later, may
the defendant be prosecuted for two sales? Current law allows separate
prosecutions for these two violations of the same statute.4 Hybrids of
these two situations arise when the defendant is prosecuted for multiple
different statutory offenses, as well as multiple alleged violations of a sin-
gle statutory offense.5
Successive prosecutions for conspiracy fall within the framework of the
second prototype. The resolution of a double jeopardy plea is often less
than clear in this second prototype because the nature of the conspiracy
offense is so different from other offenses. Unlike the sale of drugs, the
robbery of a bank, or the theft of an automobile, the starting and stop-
ping points of a conspiracy are not clearly defined. Courts must examine
a course of conduct and decide whether one conspiracy or more than one
conspiracy exists, which is considerably different from deciding whether
there was one bank robbery or two bank robberies.
The general principles of the double jeopardy doctrine relevant to this
problem have remained relatively unchanged. Although the law in this
sive prosecutions by two states for the same conduct is not barred by Double Jeopardy
Clause). Some states do prohibit prosecution after a prior prosecution by a separate sover-
eign, but this is a limit found in local law. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-4 (West
1993).
2. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement is United States v. Dixon, 113 S.
Ct. 2849 (1993). See also Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995).
3. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992).
4. United States v. Register, 931 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Griffin, 765
F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360,
1373-74 (10th Cir. 1992) (possession with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1024
(1993).
5. These problems also arise when a single prosecution is based on multiple counts,
and the question is whether the defendant can be subjected to cumulative punishment.
E.g., Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
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area has shifted, 6 the current law looks much the same as it did when
Morey v. Commonwealth7 declared in 1871:
A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subse-
quent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence re-
quired to support a conviction upon one of them would have been
sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test is not
whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but
whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offence.8
Courts have often cited this general statement in double jeopardy cases
involving each prototypical situation.9
The first situation-multiple proceedings under multiple statutes-has
been frequently litigated.10 Although, by definition, successive prosecu-
tions for conspiracy fall into the second situation, it is important to sum-
marize the major cases in the first situation, since these cases have
provided a context for decisions involving multiple prosecutions for
conspiracy."
The Supreme Court, over one hundred years ago, adopted a Morey
formulation to assess the double jeopardy defense when multiple prose-
cutions are brought under multiple statutes.' 2 This doctrine has come to
be known as the Blockburger rule, named after the leading case of Block-
6. See, e.g., Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v.
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled by
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
7. 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
8. Id. at 434.
9. The most recent statement by the United States Supreme Court of the Morey rule
is found in Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2849.
10. These cases have also inspired a substantial body of scholarly writing. E.g., MAR-
TIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969); Akhil R. Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus,
Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995); Susan W. Brenner,
S.C.A.R.F.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Double Jeopardy and Compound Criminal Liability,
27 NEW ENG. L. REv. 915 (1993); Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme
Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1993); Marilyn
E. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IOWA L. REV. 317 (1954);
Anne B. Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions in Complex
Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95 (1992) [hereinafter Poulin, A Model]; Anne
B. Poulin, Double Jeopardy: Grady and Dowling Stir the Muddy Waters, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 889 (1991); George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REV. 827 [hereinafter Thomas, An Elegant Theory]; George C. Thomas III, The
Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71
IOWA L. REV. 323 (1986); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of
Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
11. The special problems raised by multiple prosecutions for conspiracy have drawn
limited attention from commentators. PAUL MARCUS, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES § 7.06 (1994); Gordon Ireland, Double Jeopardy and Con-
spiracy in the Federal Courts, 40 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 445 (1949); Poulin, A Model,
supra note 10, at 117-25; Note, Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 387 (1957); Developments in the Law, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920,
963-68 (1959); Timothy R. Coyne, Note, "Totality of Circumstances" Test Used in Conspir-
acy Defendants' Double Jeopardy Cases, 33 VILL. L. REV. 674 (1988); Note, "Single vs.
Multiple" Criminal Conspiracies: A Uniform Method of Inquiry for Due Process and
Double Jeopardy Purposes, 65 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1980).
12. Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1889).
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burger v. United States.13 Blockburger relied heavily on Morey and re-
stated Morey as follows:
Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element.
The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction consti-
tutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is
whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not.14
Thus, Blockburger approved separate punishments in a single prosecution
for selling drugs without the required stamp and for selling the same
quantity of drugs without a written order.15 Although this test examines
and compares the elements of the statutes in question, it has often been
referred to as a "same evidence" test.16
Blockburger's "same evidence" test has received continuous criticism. 17
In Grady v. Corbin,18 the Court substantially modified Blockburger by
13. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
14. Id. at 304.
15. In Blockburger, the Court dealt with multiple punishments imposed on multiple
charges tried at a single trial. It has been persuasively argued that Blockburger would lead
to ludicrous results if it were applied to multiple punishments imposed after multiple trials.
See Thomas, An Elegant Theory, supra note 10, at 847. The Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement in Dixon takes the position that Blockburger is equally relevant to multi-
ple punishments following a single trial and to multiple punishments following multiple
trials:
The centerpiece of Justice SOUTER's analysis is an appealing theory of a
"successive prosecution" strand of the Double Jeopardy Clause that has a
different meaning from its supposed "successive punishment" strand. We
have often noted that the Clause serves the function of preventing both suc-
cessive punishment and successive prosecution, see, e.g., North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), but there is no
authority, except Grady, for the proposition that it has different meanings in
the two contexts. That is perhaps because it is embarrassing to assert that the
single term "same offence" (the words of the Fifth Amendment at issue here)
has two different meanings-that what is the same offense is yet not the same
offense.
113 S. Ct. at 2860 (emphasis in original).
16. Poulin, A Model, supra note 10, at 100 & n.13. The Court has recently began to
use the more descriptive phrase-"same elements." United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849, 2856 (1993).
17. For example, George C. Thomas III asserts:
If "same offense" means the same statutory offense, the term is self-defining,
but the protection is very limited. Many criminal statutes overlap in scope,
thus creating the possibility of a series of trials based on the same conduct.
For example, one commentator noted that a single sale of narcotics could
p rove the seller guilty of nine federal offenses. An interpretation of the
D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause that permits nine trials for a single sale trivial-
izes the clause and the finality principle that underlies it. The image of nine
indictments, nine arraignments, nine preliminary examinations, nine jury se-
lections, nine proofs of the same sale, nine jury deliberations, and nine ver-
dicts-occurring over a period of years-is a darkly mocking picture of
justice reminiscent of Kafka's The Trial.
Thomas, An Elegant Theory, supra note 10, at 847 (footnotes omitted).
18. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
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adding a second layer of analysis. 19 In Grady, the defendant pleaded
guilty to drunk driving and failure to keep his automobile on the right
side of the road. He was later indicted for vehicular homicide arising out
of the same incident. He pleaded a double jeopardy defense based upon
his earlier plea to the traffic offenses. Although Blockburger forbids rep-
rosecution after conviction on a lesser included offense,20 these traffic of-
fenses were not lesser included offenses to the homicide charge.21
The Court did not abandon Blockburger, but ruled that Blockburger
should be applied as a first inquiry. The Court made new law22 by declar-
ing that, even though the second prosecution survived the Blockburger
test, it might nonetheless be barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause.23
The Court saw inherent unfairness in allowing the government to bring
successive prosecutions as a means of honing its trial strategy and practic-
ing its presentation until the government "got it right."'24 For that reason,
a second prosecution would be barred, if, to establish an essential ele-
ment of the offense, the government must prove conduct for which the
defendant had already been prosecuted.
19. The Court had faced much the same facts and contentions in an earlier case, Illi-
nois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980), but had not given a definitive resolution of the issue,
sending the case back to the state courts for further consideration.
20. E.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). But the Court has been unwilling to
follow out the full implications of the lesser included offense doctrine when the greater
offense is a non-traditional offense of a complex nature. See Garrett v. United States, 471
U.S. 773, 789 (1985) (prosecution for a predicate offense does not necessarily bar prosecu-
tion for a continuing criminal enterprise); see also Amar & Marcus, supra note 10, at 29-30
(persuasively arguing that the treatment of lesser included offenses is not consistent with
Blockburger).
21. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 719 (1989) (lesser offense must be part
of the legal definition of the greater offense, based upon a comparison of the statutory
elements of the two offenses).
22. The Grady majority asserted that its decision was based on its earlier decisions in
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), and other authorities. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. at 515-19. The
dissenters took quite a different view. 495 U.S. at 536-44. Although Grady may have been
presaged in the Court's earlier opinions, that opinion was by no means a restatement of
obvious, well-accepted principles, as evidenced by its explicit overruling by Dixon. See
supra note 6. See also United States v. Salerno, 964 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing to
give Grady retroactive application because it was a new development).
23. The majority reasoned that the Blockburger test was developed in the context of
multiple punishments imposed in a single prosecution. They concluded Blockburger was
simply a rule of statutory construction and a guide to determining whether the legislature
had intended multiple punishments. Blockburger was not deemed to speak to the factually
different situation in which the defendant was prosecuted in successive prosecutions.
Grady, 495 U.S. at 516-18. Just three years later, Dixon explicitly rejected the premise that
the Double Jeopardy Clause can have a different meaning in different contexts and de-
clared Blockburger to be the constitutional standard for both multiple punishments and
multiple prosecutions. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860.
24. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (the Double Jeopardy Clause "prevents
the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive
attempts at conviction"); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (in applying collateral
estoppel, the Court prohibited "what every good attorney would do-he refined his pres-
entation in light of the turn of events at the first trial"); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187 (1957) ("the State should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense").
19961
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Under this new approach, the State was forbidden to prove vehicular
homicide predicated on drunkenness or on failure to stay on the right-
hand-side of the road. The prosecution could, however, rely on proof of
speeding or some other traffic violation to prove its homicide charge.
The Court noted that it was not adopting, and refused to adopt, a "same
transaction" test.2 5 Under that test, which would amount to a rule of
compulsory joinder, the Government would have been precluded from
bringing any homicide charge because Corbin had already been punished
for the transaction leading to the vehicular homicide. The Court did not
seem to be overly troubled by the fact that, under its new test, the Gov-
ernment would still have considerable leeway to hone or at least modify
its theory of the case through multiple prosecutions.2 6
The Court soon had an opportunity to test the application of Grady. In
United States v. Felix,2 7 the defendant had been convicted of various drug
offenses, but had not been charged with conspiracy. He was later in-
dicted for a conspiracy offense, and some of the overt acts in support of
the conspiracy charge involved the same conduct underlying his prior
convictions. Had Grady been rigorously applied, the Court would have
rejected a conspiracy charge based on proof of the prior prosecuted con-
duct, although it would have allowed proof of conduct not previously
prosecuted.28 But the Court did not reach this conclusion. It observed
that conspiracy was an offense with elements different from the non-con-
spiracy offenses. The Court stressed that the agreement to violate the law
was the essence of the conspiracy offense29 and was not an element of the
previously prosecuted drug offenses. Its pre-Grady decisions had repeat-
edly held that conspiracy was an offense separate from offenses commit-
ted pursuant to a conspiracy. 30 The Court refused to consider the
suggestion that the agreement found in a conspiracy is proved by the
same conduct that is often charged as completed offenses. 31 The Court
25. Grady, 495 U.S. at 523-24 n.15.
26. Under a "same transaction" test, the prosecution would be obliged to bring at one
time all charges arising from a single criminal transaction. Justice Brennan has long advo-
cated this reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 387-
88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting), but the Court has persistently refused to take this ap-
proach, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985), except to the extent that a
prior acquittal may create collateral estoppel, see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 436.
Compulsory joinder is advocated in STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 13-
2.3 (1986); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09 (1962).
27. 503 U.S. 378 (1992).
28. Id. at 388 ("Taken out of context, and read literally, this language [from Grady]
supports the defense of double jeopardy.").
29. Id. at 389-90.
30. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778; lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 781-82 (1975);
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 449 (1949); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532,
542 (1947); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); Braverman v. United States,
317 U.S. 49 (1942); United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1940); Pettibone v.
United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893).
31. Felix, 503 U.S. at 391-92. The majority made explicit reference to the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd and re-
manded, 112 S. Ct. 1657, aff'd, 982 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1992). Justices Stevens and Blackman,
concurring in Felix, believed that since the essence of conspiracy is an agreement, the overt
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did not overrule Grady, but held that Grady would not bar a conspiracy
prosecution when the defendant had been prosecuted for a related com-
pleted offense. Instead, conspiracy prosecutions would be tested solely
under the Blockburger rule. Although Grady was not explicitly over-
ruled, the Court refused to go to the second step of the analysis mandated
in Grady.
Felix's large exception to Grady proved to be Grady's undoing. The
following year, the Court, relying in part on Felix, overruled Grady in
United States v. Dixon.32 The Felix exception was viewed as an example
of Grady's unworkable nature and became a basis for overruling Grady.33
Dixon emphatically announced a return to Blockburger as the sole
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are actually separate from the conspiracy itself. For
that reason, relying on Grady, they would reach the same result as the majority. Felix, 503
U.S. at 392.
32. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). Dixon was a consolidation of two cases, both arising in the
District of Columbia. Dixon was given bond in a murder case and was ordered not to
violate any laws while on bond. Dixon was later charged with a drug offense. Before he
was tried on the drug offense, he was held in contempt of court based on proof of the drug
offense. When he later stood trial on the drug offense, he asserted a double jeopardy
defense, based on his prior punishment for contempt of court. In a companion case, Foster
was put under a civil protective order not to assault his wife. He was tried on various
contempt charges arising out of separate assaults on his wife. He was also indicted for
assault, assault with intent to kill, and threats to kidnap for these same incidents, and he
pleaded double jeopardy as a defense to the indictment.
Five of the Justices agreed to overrule Grady and to return to Blockburger. However.
the application of Blockburger caused a serious division among the five Justices. Justices
Scalia and Kennedy believed the Court must compare the elements of the offense that had
to be established in the contempt proceeding with the elements of the offense in the crimi-
nal case. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856. Since the elements of the drug offense had to be
established in order to prove contempt, Dixon could not be prosecuted for the same events
charged in the indictment for the drug offenses. Id. at 2858. In Foster's case, the defendant
could not be prosecuted for assault, since he had already been held in contempt of court
for assault. Foster could be prosecuted, however, for the same incidents on charges of
assault with intent to kill and threats to kidnap and injure. Since the civil protective order
prohibited assault, his contempt was predicated solely on proof of the elements of assault,
but not assault with intent to kill or threats to kidnap. Thus, consistent with Blockburger,
these more serious charges were not barred by a double jeopardy plea. Id. at 2859.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and two other Justices agreed that Grady should be overruled,
but argued that Justice Scalia's opinion did not properly apply Blockburger. Id. at 2865
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In their view, the underlying
conduct-drug dealing or assault-was not an element of the offense of contempt of court.
The elements of the offense are the existence of a court order and willful violation of that
order. The Rehnquist opinion charged that once a court goes beyond those generic ele-
ments, it slips into a Grady analysis. Id. at 2867.
33. As Justice Scalia stated:
But Grady was not only wrong in principle; it has already proved unstable in
application. Less than two years after it came down, in United States v. Felix,
we were forced to recognize a large exception to it. There we concluded that
a subsequent prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture, possess, and dis-
tribute methamphetamine was not barred by a previous conviction for at-
tempt to manufacture the same substance. We offered as a justification for
avoiding a "literal" (i.e., faithful) reading of Grady "longstanding authority"
to the effect that prosecution for conspiracy is not precluded by prior prose-
cution for the substantive offense. Of course, the very existence of such a
large and longstanding "exception" to the Grady rule gave cause for concern
that the rule was not an accurate expression of the law.
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863 (citations omitted).
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double jeopardy test to be used both in multiple punishment cases and in
successive prosecution cases. 34 Although Dixon did not hold that double
jeopardy must be tested solely under the law existent as of the date when
the Fifth Amendment was enacted, 35 Dixon stressed that Blockburger has
deep historical roots that must be respected. 36 Blockburger was trans-
formed into the measure of constitutional protection. 37 Grady was over-
ruled because it did not embody traditional double jeopardy law.
This passage implies that Grady was intended to overrule and displace Blockburger.
Grady never so held. Instead, Grady added a layer of analysis. In Felix, there was no
double jeopardy, since the Court refused to go to the second level. Felix did not demon-
strate Grady's unworkability. Felix illustrated the Court's unwillingness to go to Grady's
second level.
34. As Justice Scalia stated:
We have often noted that the [Double Jeopardy] Clause serves the function
of preventing both successive punishment and successive prosecution, but
there is no authority, except Grady, for the proposition that it has different
meanings in the two contexts. That is perhaps because it is embarrassing to
assert that the single term "same offense" (the words of the Fifth Amend-
ment at issue here) has two different meanings-that what is the same of-
fense is yet not the same offense.
Id. at 2860 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
35. Justice Scalia's opinion implicitly acknowledged that a strictly historical approach
would not work in the context of Dixon, since the use of the contempt power in Dixon was
historically anomalous. That is, at common law, a court would not have entered the sort of
orders that formed the heart of the contempt prosecutions in Dixon. Id. at 2855. The
concurring Justices persuasively noted a rich historical tradition that allowed further prose-
cution after a finding of contempt. Id. at 2865-66. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
In a broader sense, it is clear that the Court has not adhered to a strict historical reading
of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (allowing
a government appeal).
36. Justice Scalia stated: "Blockburger analysis ... has deep historical roots and has
been accepted in numerous precedents of this Court .... [T]he 'same-conduct' rule it[Grady] announced is wholly inconsistent with the earlier Supreme Court precedent and
with the clearer common-law understanding of double jeopardy." Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at
2860.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court traced Blockburger's roots back to The King v.
Vandercomb, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (K.B. 1796). 113 S. Ct. at 2863. It is highly questionable
that Vandercomb provides any historical roots for Blockburger or Dixon. Vandercomb
dealt with an acquittal based upon a variance between charge and proof. Since the defend-
ants in Vandercomb had been acquitted for a variance, they were not in jeopardy for the
burglary charged and could be once again charged for a burglary involving the same trans-
action. See authorities cited infra note 53. The Supreme Court has rejected Vandercomb's
rule. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75-78 (1978); Ball v. United States, 163
U.S. 662 (1896) (acquittal on a defective indictment bars later prosecution, reviewing the
English authorities and decisively rejecting them). Moreover, there was no question in
Vandercomb concerning offenses that had different elements, the issue in Dixon.
Curiously, Vandercomb referred to the then traditional practice of refusing to give a
copy of the prior indictment to the defense. Instead, the defense was merely entitled to
listen to a slow reading of the prior indictment. 168 Eng. Rep. at 457. No one suggests that
this traditional aspect of double jeopardy law should be fixed as part of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Indeed, traditional double jeopardy law had many unattractive features that have
been decisively rejected. See, e.g., Ireland's Case, 7 How. St. Tr. 79 (1678) (court prohib-
ited jury from deliberating because evidence insufficient to convict, and second prosecu-
tion allowed once crown had strengthened its case), discussed in Thomas, An Elegant
Theory, supra note 10, at 843-44.
37. Garrett v. United States had earlier declared that Blockburger was merely a canon
of statutory interpretation. 471 U.S. at 780.
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Although five Justices agreed to overrule Grady and to return to
Blockburger, they disagreed sharply on their application of Blockburger
to the facts presented in Dixon. One faction charged-quite plausibly-
that the other faction's application of Blockburger was no different than
the Grady analysis.38 Dixon involved such unusual facts that it may be
too soon to say what Dixon really means. Dixon may prove as ephemeral
as Grady and may itself be overruled or greatly modified.39
To return to the observation made earlier, double jeopardy law has not
substantially changed since Morey. But double jeopardy is a vexing area
of the law and could be subject to major changes.40
In the first situation, the Court limits itself to a comparison of the statu-
tory elements of the charged offenses. In the second situation the statu-
tory elements of the charged offenses are identical. The Court must
therefore make different inquiries, although in a general sense its inquir-
ies fit within the classic Morey formulation.41 In this second situation, the
Court compares the indictments and considers whether evidence suffi-
cient to prove one indictment would be sufficient to prove the other in-
dictment.42 For example, if A is convicted of murdering B, that
conviction would not bar an indictment for murdering C. If the indict-
ment charges A with murdering B, proof that A murdered C should be
excluded. Even if allowed, either erroneously or for some limited pur-
pose, A's murder of C will not by itself sustain the charge that A mur-
dered B and will not permit a finding of guilt, not even as to C's murder,
even though it might be clear that A murdered C. Since, on an indict-
ment for the murder of B, A cannot be convicted of C's murder, A's trial
for murdering B is no bar to a later trial for murdering C.
38. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and Justices O'Connor and Thomas,
reasoned that under Blockburger, the elements of the prior prosecution for contempt of
court were the existence of a court order made known to the defendant and a willful viola-
tion of that order. The elements of contempt of court were in no way identical to the
elements of the drug offenses and the assault offenses tried separately. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at
2866. Justice Scalia, charged the concurring Justices, should have focused solely on the
statutory elements, not on the underlying facts that were employed to establish contempt
of court:
By focusing on the facts needed to show a violation of the specific court
orders involved in this case, and not on the generic elements of the crime of
contempt of court, Justice Scalia's double jeopardy analysis bears a striking
resemblance to that found in Grady-not what one would expect in an opin-
ion that overrules Grady.
Id. at 2867.
39. As noted earlier, the Court has a history of overruling itself in the double jeopardy
area. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), the Court, over
vigorous dissent, ruled that a marijuana tax was impermissible double punishment. The
ruling has started much debate about the double jeopardy treatment of civil forfeitures.
See, e.g., United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216-22 (9th Cir. 1994).
41. See supra text accompanying note 8 (quoting Morey formulation).
42. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 379-81 (1906); Piquett v. United States, 81
F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 664 (1936); Ferracane v. United States, 29 F.2d
691, 692 (7th Cir. 1928); Henry v. United States, 15 F.2d 365, 366 (1st Cir. 1926).
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This statement of the double jeopardy test presupposes the existence of
the fatal variance doctrine. 43 Anglo-American law has always recognized
the doctrine that the indictment limits the evidence.44 The impermissible
incongruity between charge and proof is called fatal variance or variance.
In part, the doctrine is one of fairness; that is, the defendant should know
what the charges are and should not be subjected to last-minute
changes. 45 The doctrine also rests on the constitutional right to indict-
ment by grand jury. 46
II. THE VARIANCE DOCTRINE AND ITS RELATION TO
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The variance doctrine has traditionally led to some technical results. 47
But, over the years, the concept of variance has been greatly diluted to
the advantage of the prosecution,48 parallelling the development in civil
procedure that amendments to the pleadings are freely allowed unless
there is substantial prejudice to the opponent.49 Under the modern for-
mulation of the variance doctrine, the prosecution may prove any crime
43. A number of federal cases distinguish between amendment, which is not allowed
unless the amendment goes to a "formal" defect, e.g., Russell v. United States, 369 U.S.
749, 770 (1962) (dictum), and variance, which is allowed unless the variance is "prejudicial"
and, hence, fatal, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960). It is questionable
whether this distinction has any real significance. In all instances, the question is whether
the incongruity between pleading and proof is material or prejudicial. See United States v.
Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 856-58 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
44. As early as 1813, Chief Justice Marshall declared in The Schooner Hoppet v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 389, 394-95 (1813):
The rule that a man shall not be charged with one crime and convicted of
another, may sometimes cover real guilt, but its observance is essential to the
preservation of innocence. It is only a modification of this rule, that the ac-
cusation on which the prosecution is founded, should state the crime which is
to be proved, and state such a crime as will justify the judgment to be
pronounced.
The reasons for this rule are,
1st. That the party accused may know against what charge to direct his
defence.
2d. That the Court may see with judicial eyes that the fact, alleged to have
been committed, is an offence against the laws, and may also discern the
punishment annexed by law to the specific offence .... It is therefore a
maxim of the civil law that a decree must be secundum alegata as well as
secundum probata. It would seem to be a maxim essential to the due admin-
istration of justice in all courts.
45. Russell, 369 U.S. at 766 (fundamental fairness requires that defendant know the
charge and that the prosecution be unable to obtain a conviction on one ground and up-
hold it on another).
46. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138 (1985); Russell, 369 U.S. at 770-71;
Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218-19.
47. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (indictment charged fraud on Comptroller of
the Currency and his agent; proof showed fraud only on Comptroller's agent; conviction
could not stand), overruled in part by United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985) (Govern-
ment need not prove all allegations, so long as allegations proven amount to a crime
charged within the indictment).
48. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (variance must be substantial and must
cause prejudice, as is required in civil cases).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
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that is fairly comprehended within the terms of the indictment and need
not prove all the indictment's allegations, so long as its proof does not
broaden the terms of the indictment.50 Even under traditional variance
doctrine, the prosecution was permitted to prove facts contrary to those
alleged if the facts were not material.51 "Materiality" is not subject to
rigid standards and has evolved to give the prosecution more flexibility. 52
To the extent that the variance doctrine imposes a rigorous pleading
and proof obligation on the prosecution, it would seem to impose a corre-
sponding less rigorous burden on the prosecution in the double jeopardy
context. If the prosecution's proof is strictly limited by the indictment,
then the prosecution would seem to have greater freedom under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to bring a second indictment that calls for proof
not exactly matching the proof required under the first indictment.5 3 But,
to the extent that the prosecution has leeway under the variance doctrine,
the defendant would seem to have greater protection under the double
jeopardy doctrine. 54
Indeed, the defendant's double jeopardy protection is even more gen-
erous because the courts have been unwilling to posit a strict equivalency
between the two doctrines when doing so would defeat a double jeopardy
defense. The courts have gone beyond a comparison of the texts of the
two indictments in order to determine whether the two prosecutions were
for the same offense. The defendant has been allowed to introduce evi-
dence to establish that the two charged offenses are in fact a single of-
fense.55 At a fairly early stage, even when variance placed substantial
limits on the prosecution, the courts announced that double jeopardy pro-
tection could not be thwarted by artful pleading. 56 The courts recognized
50. Miller, 471 U.S. at 130.
51. Modern variance doctrine even suggests that if a defendant makes a tactical deci-
sion to lie back and make use of "variance," he has demonstrated that he was not misled or
prejudiced, which deprives him of a variance claim. United States v. Alvarez, 972 F.2d
1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1427 (1993). If this approach is taken
seriously, then variance doctrine offers the defendant only illusory protection.
52. Russell, 369 U.S. at 770; Berger, 295 U.S. at 78.
53. See The King v. Vandercomb, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (K.B. 1796); FRIEDLAND, supra
note 10, at 65-69; 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
283 (1883).
54. See FRIEDLAND, supra note 10, at 69-72. For an early example, see United States
v. Nickerson. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 204 (1854).
55. Russell, 369 U.S. at 764 (defendants "could rely upon other parts of the present
record in the event that future proceedings should be taken against them"); Bartell v.
United States, 227 U.S. 427, 433 (1913) ("it is the right of the accused to resort to parol
testimony to show the subject-matter of the former conviction"); Durland v. United States,
161 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1896) ("parol evidence is always admissible, and sometimes neces-
sary, to establish the defence [sic] of prior conviction or acquittal"); Dunbar v. United
States, 156 U.S. 185, 191 (1895) ("parol testimony ... is often requisite to sustain a plea of
once in jeopardy"); Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 186
U.S. 553 (1932).
56. Writing in the 17th century, Hale recognized this practice as well-entrenched:
If a man be indicted for the robbery or murder of John a Stiles and acquitted,
and after indicted for the robbery or murder of John a Nokes, yet he may
plead auterfoits acquit, and aver it to be the same person notwithstanding the
variance in the sirname, for a man may have divers surnames .... If A. be
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that the right not to be tried twice for the same offense is not the same as
the right to have fair notice of the charges or to have the protection of
indictment by a grand jury.
In order to compare the two indictments and any supplementary evi-
dence, the court must have an understanding of the offense's "unit of
prosecution." Determination of an offense's unit of prosecution is not
always an easy task.57 These difficulties are more pronounced when the
court confronts an arguably "continuing" or "continuous" offense. Con-
tinuing is not a reference to the defendant's recidivist behavior. Instead,
when the legislature places no temporal limits on an offense, the offense
is said to be continuing in nature, and there may be only one prosecution
and one punishment for all criminal activity occurring prior to the date of
indictment. For example, is operating an illegal tavern one offense, or as
many offenses as there are drinks poured, customers served, or days of
operation?58 The answer depends upon a particularized reading of legis-
lative intent in each instance.59
In Ex parte Snow,60 the Court pulled these various strands together.
Snow illustrated that the Supreme Court will not confine itself to the alle-
gations of the indictment if those allegations are subject to artificial ma-
nipulation and if the unit of prosecution is open-ended. Snow, a
practicing polygamist in the Territory of Utah, was charged with three
counts of unlawful cohabitation for three successive calendar years with
the same seven women. The Court held that cohabitation is "inherently,
a continuous offence."'61 Absent a specific legislative definition of the
offense that included temporal boundaries, the offense could not be made
the subject of multiple prosecutions. The prosecution could not divide
three years of cohabitation into three separate offenses, just as it could
not have brought a separate charge for each month or for each week of
indicted in the county of B. for a robbery or other felony supposed to be
done at D. in the county of B. and be acquitted, and be afterwards indicted
for a robbery upon the same person in the county of B. but at another vill,
yet he shall plead auterfoits acquit notwithstanding the variance of the vill,
and may aver it to be the same ....
2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 244-45 (1682). See also
WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 399 (1895) ("It would be
absurd to suppose that, by varying the day, parish, or any other allegation the precise
accuracy of which is not material, the prosecutor could change the rights of a defendant,
and subject him to a second trial.").
57. Compare Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915) (multiple convictions for opening
multiple sacks of mail during a single incident) with Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169
(1958) (single shotgun blast at multiple federal law enforcement agents is a single assault).
58. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 126 Mass. 259 (1879) (keeping a tavern is a single
continuing offense).
59. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70 (1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
169-70 & n.8 (1977).
60. 120 U.S. 274 (1887).
61. Id. at 281.
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cohabitation. 62 Since the legislature had set no temporal bounds on the
offense, any limit set by the prosecution was inherently arbitrary.63
The Court amplified this doctrine in Ex parte Nielsen.64 Nielsen was
charged with cohabitation with two women for a period of time ending on
May 13, 1888. He was also charged with adultery with one of the same
two women on May 14, 1888. The Court ruled that adultery was a lesser
included offense of cohabitation, which,. even under the Morey rule,
would normally bar a separate prosecution for cohabitation. 65 The Gov-
ernment, however, had a second argument to uphold Nielsen's convic-
tion. Although adultery might generally be a lesser included offense of
cohabitation, the adultery in Nielsen's case could not be a lesser included
offense, the Government argued, since the cohabitation charged in the
indictment covered a period of time different from that of the adultery.
The Government was obviously calling for a technical comparison of the
two indictments.
The Court rejected this approach by allowing the prisoner to show that
he had in fact cohabited with the same two women beyond the May 13
date specified in the indictment. 66 The indictment's allegations could not
turn a continuous offense into a series of separate offenses, at least if the
defendant was willing to challenge the assertions in the indictment. Only
the legislature, not the prosecutor or the grand jury, could make an inher-
ently continuous crime into several offenses. Because time was not an
essential element of the offense, the allegations of the indictment could
not make time material so as to eliminate a double jeopardy defense.
62. The Court extensively relied on the English case of Crepps v. Durden, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777), which disapproved separate fines for each loaf of bread sold by a
baker on Sunday in violation of a statute that provided, "no tradesman ... shall do or
exercise any worldly labour [sic]... on the Lord's Day .. " Id. at 1285. Lord Mansfield
had held that the statute permitted only one violation per Sunday, regardless of how many
loaves of bread the baker made or sold. Snow also relied on Robinson, 126 Mass. at 259,
which ruled that keeping a house for the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages was a continu-
ous offense.
63. Robinson, 126 Mass. at 259, reflects an early application of Morey. The defendant
was prosecuted for operating an illegal tavern between January 1 and May 28, 1878, and
was acquitted on June 19, 1878. He was then charged with operating an illegal tavern
between January 1 and August 20, 1878. The court held the double jeopardy defense
should be sustained and that the court could not revise the indictment to charge an offense
between June 19 and August 20, 1878.
64. 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
65. Id. at 187. Although the Court professed to follow Morey, it is questionable
whether it was entirely faithful to Morey. Since cohabitation does not require that any of
the participants be married, but adultery does make this requirement, it is doubtful that
adultery, under a strict application of Morey, is a lesser included offense. This is an obser-
vation that even Nielsen acknowledged had some merit, since Morey had found no double
jeopardy under almost identical statutes. Id. at 189. But the Court ruled that the common
element of sexual intercourse was sufficient to make adultery a lesser included offense of
cohabitation, even though Snow had earlier stated that holding oneself out as married, not
sexual intercourse, was the key element of cohabitation. Id. at 187.
It should be noted that adultery is not a continuous offense, since each act of intercourse
amounts to a new offense. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 377-79 (2d ed. 1969).
Hence, the Supreme Court created the anomalous situation of a non-continuing offense,
adultery, being the lesser included offense of a continuing crime, cohabitation.
66. Id. at 185.
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In Snow, the Court looked at the two charges and drew conclusions
from the face of the indictment. In Nielsen, the Court went beyond the
indictment to consider factual matters not contained in the four corners
of the charging instrument. Unfortunately, neither case dealt with a fact
pattern that would have thrown more light on the Court's commitment to
double jeopardy; neither case involved a polygamist who added or de-
leted cohabitants from his polygamous relationship. 67
The preceding discussion demonstrates that it is important to deter-
mine the "unit of prosecution" for conspiracy. One must know the con-
spiracy's unit of prosecution in order to analyze a double jeopardy plea to
a conspiracy charge.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY
Conspiracy is the embodiment of a continuing offense. The unit of
prosecution is the agreement,68 but this generality is largely uninforma-
tive unless one knows the details of the particular agreement. Conspiracy
has no natural limits. Since conspiracy is an agreement to commit an of-
fense or offenses, its limits are determined by those who make the agree-
ment. Once a person enters a conspiracy, he cannot withdraw from it
unless he takes affirmative action that disavows or defeats the purpose of
the conspiracy (tattling to the police is the classic, although not the exclu-
sive, method of withdrawal).69 The conspiracy is said to continue even as
67. More recently, in Brown, 432 U.S. at 169-70, the Court held that, because "joyrid-
ing" in a stolen vehicle was a continuing offense, the prosecution could not bring separate
prosecutions charging joyriding on different days in the same stolen car. Although Brown
is best known for its discussion of greater and lesser offenses, it is also significant for its
continued insistence that when a statute sets no temporal limits on an offense, a prosecutor
may not bring multiple charges by arbitrarily dividing a range of time into separate
fragments.
68. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1992).
69. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65 (1978); Hyde &
Schneider v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1912); United States v. Schweihs, 971
F.2d 1302, 1323 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Nerlinger, 862 F.2d 967, 974-75 (2d Cir.
1988); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1268 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1117 (1983); United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521, 528 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1089 (1980); United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1076 (1979); United States v. Heathington, 545 F.2d 972, 973 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Chester, 407 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1020 (1969); Deacon v.
United States, 124 F.2d 352, 358 (1st Cir. 1941).
If the conspiracy offense requires an overt act and if the defendant withdraws before an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy has occurred, then he has committed no offense.
But, once anyone has committed an overt act, withdrawal will not serve as a defense to the
conspiracy charge, United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1315-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1118 (1982), except to the extent that the withdrawal commences the running of
the statute of limitations as to the withdrawing defendant, United States v. Read, 658 F.2d
1225, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1981). Such a defendant may be able to plead a statute of limita-
tions defense that would be unavailable to the other conspirators. Even when withdrawal
does not defeat a charge of conspiracy, it does have the effect of defeating liability under
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), for substantive offenses committed by co-
conspirators after withdrawal. United States v. Gonzalez, 797 F.2d 915, 916-17 (10th Cir.
1986). Withdrawal has also been said to exclude the later declarations of co-conspirators.
United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 978 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (dictum).
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old members leave and new members join.70 This proposition results
from the basic premise that the conspiracy is not a group of individuals,
but is rather an agreement;71 hence, the identity of the conspirators is
immaterial to the offense.
Whether there is one conspiracy or many depends on a defendant's
agreement. For example, A and B agree to rob a bank and have no un-
derstanding as to future bank robberies. If they later rob additional
banks, they may have entered into a conspiracy or conspiracies separate
from their original conspiracy. On the other hand, if A and B agree to
pursue any and all prospects within a range of illegal activity, then the
conspiracy could conceivably last for years. For example, A and his un-
derlings buy and sell tons of cocaine over a five-year period. A is partici-
pating in a single conspiracy during this period.
The difficulty in setting boundaries on conspiracy comes from the di-
chotomy between its definition as a crime and the manner in which the
crime is classically proved. Conspiracy is said to be a criminal agreement,
but it must often be inferred from the cooperative acts of various individ-
uals.72 If A and B rob a bank in June, A, B, and C rob a second bank in
July, and A and C rob a third bank in August, is there one conspiracy
among all three to rob banks? Or is A in a single conspiracy to rob
banks, and are B and C in multiple conspiracies to rob banks? Or is each
robbery a separate conspiracy as to those robbers participating in that
robbery? It is doubtful the robbers ever thought about these questions,
and there will seldom, if ever, be direct evidence of their agreement, in-
cluding their intentions. Any agreement comes not from the conspira-
tors' subjective meeting of the minds but from a conclusion drawn by a
judge or jury based on all the facts and circumstances in light of the prin-
ciples of conspiracy law. Unfortunately, this focus on the actions of the
group sometimes leads to the erroneous conclusion that a conspiracy is a
group *of people, when, instead, a conspiracy is a defendant's
agreement. 73
The answer to the question-one conspiracy or many-depends upon
the context in which it is raised. Whether there is more than one conspir-
70. E.g., United States v. Rios, 842 F.2d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1031 (1989); United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
958 (1987); United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
963 (1986).
71. See authorities cited supra note 31.
72. E.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 n.10 (1975); Interstate Circuit v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939); United States v. Arzola-Amaya, 867 F.2d 1504,
1511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989). This phenomenon is an outgrowth of the
idea expressed in Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946), that conspiracy is a
continuing offense to the extent that the conspirators engage in "continuous cooperation
... to keep it up . ..."
73. United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1389-90 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); Regina v. Grif-
fiths, [1996] 1 Q.B. 589, 599 (C.C.A. 1965). See the penetrating discussion in Harriet Gal-
vin & Sherri Venokur, Note, Resolution of the Multiple Conspiracies Issue via a "Nature of
the Enterprise Analysis": The Resurrection of Agreement, 42 BROOK. L. REv. 243 (1975).
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
acy affects joinder of defendants in the indictment, 74 severance of defend-
ants for trial, 75 admissibility of evidence, 76 vicarious liability for related
substantive offenses,77 variance, and punishment,78 in addition to double
jeopardy. In each of these contexts, the law pursues different ends, even
though the question-one conspiracy or many-may seem the same be-
cause of the short-hand formula.
Any double jeopardy test based upon an examination of the indict-
ments in successive cases will probably yield little assistance. Since the
essence of the crime is the defendant's agreement with others, the iden-
tity of these others, the date of the agreement, the place of the agree-
ment, and the overt acts in furtherance of the agreement need not be set
forth with any great particularity in the indictment, 79 and are often
pleaded in the most general of terms. Even if set forth, these facts should
do little to defeat a defendant's double jeopardy protection. These non-
essential details could be manipulated too easily by careful pleading,
which Snow and Nielsen have disapproved. A court will usually have to
look beyond the indictments, unless in two different indictments the gov-
ernment has helpfully pleaded what is obviously the same offense.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES
The Supreme Court has given little direct guidance on these matters.
Since Congress enacted the general federal conspiracy statute in 1867,80 it
was only in the mid-twentieth century that the Court came to deal with
74. If the indictment charges a single conspiracy, then joinder of multiple defendants
named in the conspiratorial activities is permissible under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 8. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960). Although the allegations of the
indictment are usually conclusive as to whether joinder is proper, United States v. Velas-
quez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1354 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1021 (1986), the allegations
may occasionally reveal the existence of multiple conspiracies, despite the Government's
contention that it has pleaded merely a single conspiracy. See United States v. Levine, 546
F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1977).
75. See, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United States v. Varelli,
407 F.2d 735, 744-48 (7th Cir. 1969).
76. Declarations of co-conspirators are admissible to the extent that they were made
in furtherance of the conspiracy and during the course of the conspiracy. If a statement is
made in furtherance of conspiracy A, that statement would not be admissible to establish
the existence of a separate conspiracy B. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 771. For an example of
this principle, see United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1981).
77. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), allows punishment of conspirators,
under certain conditions, for substantive offenses on a theory of vicarious liability. But if
there are multiple conspiracies, and a defendant is a member of only one conspiracy, his
vicarious liability would extend only to offenses related to the conspiracy of which he was a
member.
78. The federal sentencing guidelines allow a defendant to be punished for conduct
committed by co-conspirators. 18 U.S.C.S. app. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (Law. Co-op. 1995). If
there are multiple conspiracies, only one of which a defendant has joined, a defendant's
punishment would be correspondingly limited.
79. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81 (1927); Williamson v. United States, 207
U.S. 425, 447-49 (1908); Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 286
U.S. 553 (1932).
80. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484 (1867).
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multiple prosecutions for conspiracy. In Braverman v. United States,81 the
Government charged the defendants in a single indictment with seven
separate conspiracy offenses as a result of a moonshining operation. The
defendants received consecutive sentences based on verdicts of guilty on
each of the seven counts. Each conspiracy charge, brought under the
general conspiracy statute, had as its object the violation of a separate
section of the Internal Revenue Code. Although in form the indictment
charged seven conspiracies, the Government conceded that there was a
single agreement to violate seven different statutes.
The Court suggested that, absent a full record, it might have been will-
ing to accept the allegation in the indictment that there were seven con-
spiracies. 82 But since the Government conceded that the proof at trial
showed a single agreement, the Court held that this agreement did not
become seven conspiracies merely because it contemplated the violation
of seven statutes.83 The agreement constitutes the crime of conspiracy:
"the single continuing agreement ... differs from successive acts which
violate a single penal statute and from a single act which violates two
statutes. '84  Hence, the defendants could not receive consecutive
sentences on each of the charged conspiracies. 85
81. 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
82. Id. at 52. Generally, the cases agreed that a conspiracy to violate several statutes
would be one conspiracy, not several conspiracies. E.g., Short v. United States, 91 F.2d
614, 622-24 (4th Cir. 1937) (later prosecution barred); Tramp v. United States, 86 F.2d 82,
83-84 (8th Cir. 1936) (indictment not duplicitous); Bertsch v. Snook, 36 F.2d 155, 156 (4th
Cir. 1929) (multiple punishments disallowed); Powe v. United States, 11 F.2d 598, 599 (5th
Cir. 1926) (multiple punishments disallowed); Murphy v. United States, 285 F. 801, 815-18
(7th Cir.) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 617 (1923); Haywood v. United
States, 268 F. 795, 805 (7th Cir. 1920)(indictment not duplicitous); Magon v. United States,
260 F. 811, 813 (9th Cir. 1919) (indictment not duplicitous), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 689
(1921); John Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 206 F. 386, 386 (8th Cir. 1913) (indict-
ment not duplicitous).
83. 317 U.S. at 52-53.
84. Id. at 54. Braverman's holding was anticipated by previous decisions. See, e.g.,
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919) (Holmes, J.) ("The conspiracy is the
crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects."); United States v. Rabinowitch, 238
U.S. 78, 86 (1915) (a single conspiracy might have for its object the violation of two or
more substantive offenses).
The lower courts had not been unanimous in endorsing the view ultimately reached in
Braverman. Schultz v. Hudspeth, 123 F.2d 729, 731-32 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 682 (1942) (allowing multiple convictions for a single transaction); Fleisher v. United
States, 91 F.2d 404, 406 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 302 U.S. 218 (1937) (reversing first count of the
indictment).
85. Braverman, 317 U.S. at 54. Braverman disapproved consecutive sentences but did
not disapprove the filing of separate conspiracy counts within a single indictment. As a
matter of pleading, the Government may either charge a single conspiracy with multiple
objects, Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1937), or multiple conspiracy counts,
each with a different substantive offense as its object, Lewis v. United States, 4 F.2d 520
(5th Cir. 1925), so long as consecutive sentences are not imposed.
After Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), it is likely that the preferred route will
be to charge a single count of conspiracy, alleging multiple offenses as the object of the
conspiracy, since Griffin allows a guilty verdict to stand upon proof that any one object of
the charged conspiracy was agreed upon by the conspirators. The Second Circuit has rec-
ommended, however, that multiple counts be presented in a single indictment so that the
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Braverman partially resolved what had been a frequently litigated
double jeopardy issue in conspiracy cases. But, thanks to the Govern-
ment's concession, the Court did not have to resolve the thorniest aspect
of the issue.86 The Supreme Court has not yet established in the double
jeopardy context how to determine whether there was one agreement or
more than one agreement.87 The Court's suggestion in Sanabria v. United
jury's attention can be better focused. United States v. Calderone, 982 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir.
1992).
86. In United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
947 (1979), the defendants were prosecuted in one proceeding for two conspiracies, one for
smuggling and one for distributing smuggled goods. The Ninth Circuit held that it was for
the jury to decide whether there was one or more than one conspiracy, and the court
refused to set aside the multiple verdicts and the multiple punishments attached. Accord
United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 105 (1994)
(defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy in Count 1, found guilty by jury on Count 2, and
sentenced on both counts). Although Richardson and Wessels are not demonstrably incon-
sistent with Braverman, they by no means represent the course of the law after Braverman.
See, e.g., United States v. Olivares, 786 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 1986) (held multiple conspir-
acy convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause).
87. In United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), the defendants filed a collateral
attack on their guilty pleas, alleging that they had pleaded guilty to the same conspiracy
charged in two separate indictments. They had been indicted in two separate indictments,
allowed those indictments to be consolidated, pleaded guilty to both indictments, and re-
ceived separate fines on each of the two indictments. When a co-conspirator successfully
waged a double jeopardy defense, the defendants regretted their guilty pleas and moved to
vacate their pleas as to the second indictment. A majority of the Court refused to consider
their argument on the merits, holding that the defendants' guilty pleas waived the double
jeopardy defense.
Justice Stevens concurred in the result. Although he stressed that the Court had not
ruled on the merits of the double jeopardy defense, he went out of his way to note his
belief that their defense was of "doubtful character." Id. at 580. He believed that it would
be possible for a defendant to participate in a grand conspiracy stretching over decades
and, at the same time, to participate simultaneously in a series of smaller related conspira-
cies, each of which could be separately prosecuted on separate occasions and punished
separately. Id. at 580-81. Justice Stevens believed that these defendants most likely fell
into this pattern.
The three dissenters argued that the merits of the double jeopardy defense should have
been reached. Quoting extensively from Short, 91 F.2d at 614, discussed infra text accom-
panying notes 110-24, the dissenters argued that there was clear support for a double jeop-
ardy defense. Id. at 584-85. They also made reference to United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d
660 (2d Cir. 1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 158-61, without indicating how
specifically, if at all, Korfant was in accord with Short. Id. at 585 n.2. All in all, Broce gives
very little indication of how the present Court would line up on the issues raised in this
Article.
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981), gives even less guidance. In Albernaz, the
Court held that there could be separate punishments for both conspiracy to import mari-
juana, 21 U.S.C. § 963, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 846. Although
Braverman prohibits the prosecution from charging separate conspiracies based merely
upon the substantive offense that the defendants agreed to commit, Albernaz allows Con-
gress to fashion a separate conspiracy peculiar to each possible substantive offense that
might be the object of conspiratorial conduct. In this regard, the Court saw ample prece-
dent for its result in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), wherein
the Court approved separate convictions for conspiracy to restrain trade and conspiracy to
monopolize, each conspiracy being the subject of a separate congressional prohibition.
Since Congress provided for separate conspiracies, Albernaz and American Tobacco
clearly came under the rule of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and do not
directly speak to the problem at hand.
The Albernaz doctrine can lead to oppressive results. United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d
1360, 1371, 1375-76 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1024 (1993) (separate charges
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States88 that conspiracies were somewhat like illegal gambling busi-
nesses89 provides no real help, since it is unclear how the courts deter-
mine whether there was one illegal gambling business or more than one
such business.90
Perhaps the Supreme Court's most famous multiple conspiracy case
(but not a double jeopardy case) is Kotteakos v. United States,91 a peren-
nial beacon of false hope for the criminal defense bar. In Kotteakos,
thirty-two defendants were charged in a single count of conspiracy. At
the center of the conspiracy were a loan broker and close associates who
helped the various defendants obtain fraudulent loans. (The broker and
his associates pleaded guilty and never went to trial.) The evidence re-
vealed that most of these borrowers did not know each other and were
indifferent to whether any of the others were successful in obtaining
fraudulent loans. It is not even clear that the individual loan recipients
knew that others were obtaining similarly fraudulent loans. Each fraudu-
lent loan was, in the Court's eyes, a separate conspiracy. 92 The broker
was the "hub" of a wheel, the borrowers were "spokes," but there was no
"rim" to complete the conspiratorial "wheel. ' 93 The lower court found as
a matter of law, and the Government conceded before the Supreme
Court, that the single conspiracy charged in the indictment was not
proven and that there were multiple conspiracies. The only question was
for conspiracy to use a firearm to facilitate a drug offense and conspiracy to manufacture,
distribute, or use drugs); United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir. 1992) (drug
importation and distribution conspiracy and RICO conspiracy can be separate charges
although they involve same conduct); United States v. Lanier, 920 F.2d 887, 894-95 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 872 (1991) (one scheme to defraud charged under separate
conspiracy statutes); United States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394, 1397-98 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1050 (1991) (separate charges for RICO conspiracy and conspiracy to
distribute drugs).
Nor does Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), although a leading double jeop-
ardy case, speak to this issue. Garrett held that prosecution for a "predicate offense"
would not bar a later prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 848, the continuing criminal enterprise
statute (CCE), since the predicate offense in question was not a lesser included offense.
Under Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977), a drug conspiracy can be regarded as a
lesser included offense of CCE, and may not be subject to separate punishment. See also
United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 989 (1991). But see
United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608 (1995);
Janet Bauman, Conspiring Drug Kingpins: Twice in Jeopardy?, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 197
(1994).
It is, however, theoretically possible that a defendant could be in separate conspiracies,
one of which is not a lesser included offense of a charged CCE, thereby allowing him to be
prosecuted for CCE after prosecution for a separate conspiracy. United States v. Evans,
951 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 920 (1992). Garrett does not resolve how
to determine the separate nature of such conspiracies.
88. 437 U.S. 54, 73-74 (1978).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
90. See United States v. DiMuro, 540 F.2d 503, 508-09 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 988 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 909 (1975).
91. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
92. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947) (explaining the Court's
prior holding in Kotteakos).
93. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755.
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whether this variance between allegation and proof was prejudicial
enough to warrant reversal and remand for separate trials.94 The Court
answered this question in the affirmative and reversed, finding that the
separate conspiracies warranted separate trials.95 In this respect, Kot-
teakos is not only a case about prejudicial variance, but it is also a case
about separate trials. 96
Kotteakos assumed that in any given case there was either one conspir-
acy or more than one conspiracy. The Court did not explore whether the
core members (the loan broker and his associates) might have been in a
single conspiracy and whether, at the same time, the borrowers might
have been in multiple conspiracies. That is, any one peripheral member
(a borrower) might have been in a conspiracy with the core members, but
not with other peripheral members. Under this analysis, the core mem-
bers would be in a single conspiracy with each other and with all the
peripheral members, even though there would also be multiple conspira-
cies, as seen from the vantage points of peripheral members. The Court
could have found that these core members were engaged in a single con-
spiracy because of their continuous efforts to obtain loans for others,
even though the borrowers were not conspiring with each other. Kot-
teakos ignored this possibility because of the doctrine that a variance
must be prejudicial97 and because the core members had pleaded guilty.
Even though Kotteakos found a variance, reversal was not automatic and
depended on a finding of prejudice, which the Court found as to the pe-
ripheral members. If, on the other hand, only core members had gone to
trial in Kotteakos, the Court could have found multiple conspiracies. In
that scenario, there would be no prejudice and no need to sever, which
would have brought the same result as a finding that the core members
were in a single conspiracy.
94. The Government relied on the harmless error statute, which had been recently
construed and applied in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
95. Id. at 776. If the court discovers in mid-trial that there are multiple conspiracies, it
has discretion whether to grant a severance, which has the effect of granting a mistrial as to
at least some of the defendants. See, e.g., Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960). If,
however, the determination of multiple conspiracies is made on appeal, the normal course
is to remand for separate trials without any consideration of the possibility of a joint trial.
See, e.g., United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 748 (7th Cir. 1969).
96. Curiously, the Court ordered retrials, not acquittals, even though prior law would
have arguably allowed acquittals. See supra note 54; Mercante v. United States, 49 F.2d
156 (10th Cir. 1931); United States v. Wills, 36 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1929). If the Government
did not prove the charged conspiracy, and the variance was material, then the proper
course would be acquittal, which could then set the stage for a double jeopardy claim. (As
noted in infra note 105 and accompanying text, post-Kotteakos cases may have made it
more difficult to establish a material variance.) By treating the issue as one of joinder, 328
U.S. at 757-58, the Court was able to deny acquittal as the remedy. Accord United States
v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1975). Later cases have made it clearer that
variance (if material) must result in acquittal, which creates a bar to re-prosecution for the
same offense. See, e.g., Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 54.
97. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 80 (1935).
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Kotteakos precipitated a vast body of case law on the variance between
a charge of a single conspiracy and the proof of multiple conspiracies. 98
Defendants devote substantial effort to establishing that they were really
members of a "smaller" conspiracy than the one charged. 99 This typically
futile' 0 0 exercise continues even after the Court's 1985 decision in United
States v. Miller,'0' which, without explicitly overruling Kotteakos, made it
a dead letter on the variance issue.
The Government charged Miller with a mail fraud scheme having two
components. He had engineered a burglary loss and had inflated the
98. E.g., United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Robinson, 956 F.2d 1388, 1393-94(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
99. This effort not only takes the form of motions for acquittal, but also the form of
requests for multiple conspiracy instructions. A typical multiple conspiracy instruction, if
given, reads as follows:
Count - of the indictment charges that defendant - knowingly and
deliberately entered into a conspiracy to [describe substantive of-
fense(s)][defraud the United States].
In order to sustain its burden of proof for this charge, the government
must show that the single [overall][umbrella][master] conspiracy alleged in
Count - of the indictment existed. Proof of separate or independent con-
spiracies is not sufficient.
In determining whether or not any single conspiracy has been shown by
the evidence in the case you must decide whether common, master, or over-
all goals or objectives existed which served as the focal point for the efforts
and actions of any members to the agreement. In arriving at this decision
you may consider the length of time the alleged conspiracy existed, the mu-
tual dependence or assistance between various persons alleged to have been
its members, and the complexity of the goal(s) or objective(s) shown.
A single conspiracy may involve various people at differing levels and may
involve numerous transactions which are conducted over some period of
time and at various places. In order to establish a single conspiracy, how-
ever, the government need not prove that an alleged co-conspirator knew
each of the other alleged members of the conspiracy nor need it establish
that an alleged co-conspirator was aware of each of the transactions alleged
in the indictment.
Even if the evidence in the case shows that defendant - was a mem-
ber of some conspiracy, but that this conspiracy is not the single conspiracy
charged in the indictment, you must acquit defendant _ .
Unless the government proves the existence of the single [over-
all][umbrella][master] conspiracy described in the indictment beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, you must acquit defendant _ .
2 EDWARD J. DEVrrr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCrIONS § 28.09 (1990). This instruc-
tion is often refused as a matter of law. E.g., United States v. Gray, 47 F.3d 1359, 1368 (4th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525,530 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1648 (1994); United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1429-30 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Mazzanti, 888 F.2d 1165, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990);
United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 24 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032(1989); United States v. Ashley, 555 F.2d 462, 467-68 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869(1977). Even if the instruction is given, it is questionable whether a jury can understand the
concept, much less be willing to employ it to acquit a defendant. If the Kotteakos principle
of variance has any vitality, the defendant's best hope lies in a request for a directed find-
ing and not a jury instruction.
100. See United States v. Yant, 977 F.2d 399, 407-08 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31 (3d
Cir. 1982) (multiple mail fraud schemes) for successful effort.
101. 471 U.S. 130 (1985).
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dollar value for the allegedly stolen items. The Government proceeded
to trial only on the theory of an inflated claim and did not attempt to
prove that the burglary was at the insured's sufferance. Miller argued for
reversal on the ground that the indictment charged two aspects of the
crime and that the Government had proved only one. Overruling in part
its earlier decision in Ex parte Bain,10 2 the Court ruled that, if an indict-
ment charges multiple aspects of a crime, there is no variance, so long as
the Government can prove one of the multiple aspects.' 03 The proof may
not broaden the indictment, but it may narrow the indictment. 1' 4
Miller was not a conspiracy case, but it established a principle of broad
application that should extend to conspiracy charges. If an indictment
charges a wide-ranging conspiracy, the defendant may be convicted of
any conspiracy that can be regarded as a component or a part of the
charged conspiracy. In the later case of Griffin v. United States,10 5 the
Court explicitly held that a charge of conspiracy to commit crimes A and
B can be sustained on proof of a conspiracy to commit either crime. 0 6
Considered together, Miller and Griffin make it doubtful that Kot-
teakos remains good variance law, even on the facts presented in Kot-
teakos itself (although it should be good law on severance and
admissibility of co-conspirator declarations). If borrower A conspires
with the loan broker, but not with the other thirty borrowers, A is still
guilty of conspiracy. But this will be a narrower conspiracy than that
charged in the indictment, and there is no variance. (In Kotteakos, there
was variance, and it was prejudicial.) Even without a finding of variance,
it might still be unfair to have a joint trial with the other borrowers, which
was the other main point of Kotteakos. The variance aspect of Kotteakos,
however, seems greatly undermined by Miller.
Kotteakos provides uncertain directions for solving variance problems,
and it remains to be seen whether Kotteakos has any validity in the
double jeopardy area. If Kotteakos speaks to the double jeopardy issue,
then it would follow that the leading conspirator, "the hub of the wheel,"
could have been prosecuted and sentenced thirty-two different times for
the offense of conspiracy had the Government chosen to pursue him on
the multiple charges that the Court discerned in the sole conspiracy count
in the indictment. On its face, this possibility seems unsound °107
It is questionable whether variance and double jeopardy should have
any linkage in conspiracy cases.' 0 8 On a verbal level, the existence of
multiple conspiracies is the operative inquiry in both contexts. Variance
102. 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
103. Miller, 471 U.S. at 140-44.
104. See United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991).
105. 502 U.S. 46 (1991).
106. Id. at 49-50. Griffin gave only a glancing cite to Miller, 502 U.S. at 56-57, and
made no reference at all to Kotteakos.
107. See United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1191 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1988) (indicting
core member on nine counts of conspiracy).
108. See Note, "Single vs. Multiple" Criminal Conspiracies: A Uniform Method of In-
quiry for Due Process and Double Jeopardy Purposes, 65 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1980).
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is meant to protect a defendant's right to indictment by grand jury and his
right to fair notice of the charges. Double jeopardy, on the other hand, is
meant to protect the defendant from the unfairness of the government's
polishing its case through repeated presentation or repeatedly seeking
more punishment for the same conduct. Whether a defendant, consistent
with the Grand Jury Clause and related due process requirements, could
be convicted on the first indictment through evidence to be presented on
the second indictment really says nothing about the interests implicated
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Snow and Nielsen recognized these
limitations. 109
V. THE RESPONSE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Although the Supreme Court has given little guidance on these specific
problems, the courts of appeals have generated a substantial body of law
relating to the double jeopardy defense in successive conspiracy prosecu-
tions. A leading decision is the Fourth Circuit's 1937 decision in Short v.
United States.110 The Government argued against double jeopardy on the
ground that the indictments alleged different time periods, different loca-
tions, different co-conspirators, different overt acts, and different statu-
tory violations as the objects of the charged conspiracies. The
Government's argument was straightforward: proof of the allegations in
the later indictment would not sustain a conviction under the prior
indictments.
The Fourth Circuit methodically brushed these differences aside. The
court did not rely entirely on a broad reading of Snow, but it did rely on a
comparison of the indictments. As far as the differences in time were
concerned, the court held that the allegations in the indictments over-
lapped each other and, thus, were broad enough to allow either indict-
ment to be proved by the facts presented in the other case. 1 '
It is well settled that, where a continuing offense such as conspiracy
is charged as having been committed within a stated period, an ac-
quittal or conviction will bar another prosecution for the same of-
fense alleged as having been committed within a period which
overlaps any part of the former period. The reason is that proof of
the commission of the offense during the overlapping period is suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction under either of the indictments; and the
accused is thus subjected to double jeopardy as to offenses commit-
ted within that period.1 2
Similar comparisons were made between the two indictments as to the
differences in places and co-conspirators. 113 Anticipating Braverman,"'4
the court also ruled that the government could not turn a single conspir-
109. Snow, 120 U.S. at 274; Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 176.
110. 91 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1937).
111. Id. at 620.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
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acy into multiple conspiracies by alleging that each conspiracy had as its
object the violation of a separate provision of the criminal code. 115
Differences as to overt acts between the two indictments were of no
consequence. The court reasoned that the gist of conspiracy is the agree-
ment and not the overt acts.116
[O]nly one overt act need be alleged or proven to justify conviction
of a continuing conspiracy extending over a period of years in the
furtherance of which many overt acts may have been committed; and
to hold that a difference in the overt acts charged in the indictment
constitutes a difference in the charge of crime would permit the pros-
ecution of the same conspiracy as many times as there are acts done
in furtherance of it. This cannot be the law.1 7
One might infer from Short that, had the indictments been more nar-
rowly drawn, the court would have come to a different conclusion on
double jeopardy. This conclusion, however, would seem to be foreclosed
by Snow and Nielsen. Short itself recognized that any differences be-
tween the indictments must relate to material differences; as the court
noted, "The constitutional provision against double jeopardy is a matter
of substance and may not be thus nullified by the mere forms of plead-
ing."" 8 Although Short partially justified its result through a close com-
parison of the indictments, Short also operated on a higher plane
consistent with Snow and Nielsen to the extent that it focused on agree-
ment as the essence of the crime and discounted evidentiary detail as
determinative of the double jeopardy defense. 1 9 Short had significant
precedential support, but it also discarded and disapproved cases that had
taken a more wooden approach to double jeopardy. 120
115. Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1937).
116. It is established beyond any doubt that in a narcotics conspiracy, the crime is com-
plete upon agreement, and no overt act is required. United States v. Shabani, 115 S. Ct.
382, 383-84 (1994). The reasoning of Shabani would apply to any conspiracy statute that
makes no explicit reference to overt acts. The presumption is that conspiracy requires no
overt act unless the legislature specifically provides for the necessity of an overt act.
117. Short, 91 F.2d at 621.
118. Id. at 624. The court stated its philosophy as follows:
Blanket charges of "continuing" conspiracy with named defendants and with
"other persons to the grand jurors unknown" fulfil a useful purpose in the
prosecution of crime, but they must not be used in such a way as to contra-
vene constitutional guaranties. If the government sees fit to send an indict-
ment in this general form charging a continuing conspiracy for a period of
time, it must do so with the understanding that upon conviction or acquittal
further prosecution of that conspiracy during the period charged is barred,
and that this result cannot be avoided by charging the conspiracy to have
been formed in another district where overt acts in furtherance of it were
committed, or by charging different overt acts as having been committed in
furtherance of it, or by charging additional objects or the violation of addi-
tional statutes as within its purview, if in fact the second indictment involves
substantially the same conspiracy as the first. Id.
119. Accord United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1188 (4th Cir. 1988).
120. Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, 80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 664 (1936)
("[T]he conspiracy or conspiracies to carry out those objects must of necessity constitute
separate offenses, in view of the fact that the grand jury and the District Attorney chose to
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In addition, Short emphasized an aspect of double jeopardy law that
seems to have been forgotten in modem cases. Short did not rule on the
merits of the defendants' double jeopardy defense. Instead, Short ruled
that the district court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider that
defense.121 Since the double jeopardy defense in Short could be neither
accepted nor denied on the basis of a comparison of the indictments, de-
fendants had the right to a jury trial on their defense. 122 Historically, the
law required the jury to decide the double jeopardy defense before the
prosecution presented its case 12 3 unless the facts were so clear that a di-
rected finding would be appropriate. 124
Although Short is still considered a leading case,125 much of the recent
case law, influenced by Kotteakos, strays from Short's dictates. Signifi-
cantly, this dissonance does not seem to be recognized. The decisions of
the Second Circuit will be examined in some detail since the case law in
the Second Circuit is so extensive, is largely representative of the course
make them separate."); Ferracane v. United States, 29 F.2d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 1928); Henry
v. United States, 15 F.2d 365, 366 (1st Cir. 1926).
Ferracane stated in very broad language that conspiracy offenses would be separate of-
fenses, so long as different overt acts were alleged. 29 F.2d at 692. Stated with this degree
of generality, the proposition is incorrect and was definitely rejected in Short. But the facts
of Ferracane indicate that the second conspiracy was based upon activities that were com-
mitted after the return of the first conspiracy indictment. Properly understood, and limited
to its facts, Ferracane is a correct decision. See generally Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S.
773, 774 (1985) ("It did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause to prosecute the CCE
offense after the prior conviction for one of the predicate offenses. The CCE offense is not
the 'same' offense .... ).
121. Short, 91 F.2d at 621.
122. Modern cases have held that the defendant has no right to trial by jury on his
double jeopardy defense. Even the Fourth Circuit repudiated this aspect of Short. United
States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d
792 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 563 (1989); United States
v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979); United States
v. Young, 503 F.2d 1072, 1077 (3d Cir. 1974) (rejecting the Government's claim that it had
a right to trial by jury on the double jeopardy defense).
MacDougall reasoned that a defendant could not have a right to jury trial, since double
jeopardy is a pre-trial motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b). This ra-
tionale ignores the historical practice of trying the defense to the jury before trial of the
general issue. See generally Short, 91 F.2d at 620-21. Since at common law the defendant
had a right to trial by jury, that right has been preserved by the Sixth Amendment. See
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23
allows, under certain circumstances, a jury verdict of eleven members, which is contrary to
the holding of Patton.
Other cases have reasoned that any serious effort by the defendant to develop his doublejeopardy claim to a jury would prejudice the jury against him if he lost the double jeopardy
claim and had to try his case on the general issue. This concern, although well intentioned,
not only ignores the historical right to trial by jury but also discounts the possibility that, if
need be, a second jury could be impanelled. See FRIEDLAND, supra note 10, at 115 n.1.
123. See Rankin v. Tennessee, 78 U.S. 380, 381 (1871); Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] A.C.
1254, 1259 (H.L.).
124. See Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271,273-74 (1894); Connelly, [1964] A.C.
at 1259. In United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 663, 665-66 (1896), the defendants presented
their double jeopardy plea both before trial and at trial. The Court did not make any
comments on this procedure.
125. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 583-84 (1989) (dissent's approval of
Short). The majority refused to consider the merits of the double jeopardy claim and made
no comment about Short.
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of the law as found in the other circuits, and has been influential with the
other circuits.
The first modern Second Circuit decision is United States v. Maz-
zochi,126 in which the defendants pleaded guilty to two counts of conspir-
acy. One count alleged a conspiracy leading to a sale of drugs on a
specific day, and the other count alleged a conspiracy leading to a sepa-
rate sale of drugs on the same day. Although the defendants pleaded
guilty to both counts, the court set aside the consecutive sentences
imposed.
It might indeed be possible to describe in substantially the same
terms two conspiracies, really separate because from the outset one
was to result in one sale only, the other in another; but the scheme
alleged in these counts forbids such an interpretation. It is apparent
that at the outset no particular sale could have been specifically in
mind; the conspirators could not know to whom they would sell; they
arranged a plan for disposing of their drugs by which they should be
sold on general solicitation, and the specific sales were the result of
that method ....
Now it would be preposterous to argue that, if several persons
combined to sell drugs generally, that single venture breaks up into
as many separate ventures as there chance to be sales. The sales are
the conclusion and the fruit of the original plan, the very reason for
its being; they may be multiform, but the plan is single. In this re-
gard a conspiracy is wholly unlike the substantive crimes which it
contemplates. 127
Mazzochi wisely focused on the act of agreement, even though the de-
fendants' completed drug sales were the only available evidence as to
their intent. The court was unwilling to find multiple agreements merely
because there were multiple sales.128
Kotteakos played a significant role in the Second Circuit's analysis in
United States v. Mallah,129 the next major case. Defendant Pacelli chal-
lenged his conspiracy conviction on the basis of double jeopardy. A prior
indictment, on which he had been convicted, charged a narcotics conspir-
acy between January 1, 1971 and June 14, 1971. The indictment under
review charged a narcotics conspiracy between January 1, 1971 and Sep-
tember 23, 1973. Both conspiracies allegedly had New York City as the
base of operations. The first indictment named a small number of con-
spirators, as well as other unnamed conspirators, both known and un-
known. The second indictment named numerous conspirators, although
it did not name any individual named in the first indictment. Each indict-
ment alleged different overt acts in support of the conspiracy, and the
evidence demonstrated that Pacelli had a key role in the activities alleg-
126. 75 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1935) (per curiam).
127. Id. at 497-98 (citation omitted).
128. Since the defendants in Mazzochi pleaded guilty, it is questionable whether they
would be able to claim double jeopardy protection. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 563, although
Broce involved multiple prosecutions on separate occasions.
129. 503 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1975).
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edly forming the two conspiracies. The Government argued that the two
conspiracies were separate since the named conspirators and the overt
acts in each indictment were different.
The court acknowledged that the traditional double jeopardy test fo-
cuses on whether evidence to support a conviction under one indictment
would also support a conviction under the other indictment. 130 Under a
strict application of this test, Pacelli would have had difficulty in proving
a double jeopardy defense, since the alleged co-conspirators and overt
acts 131 were different in the two indictments. The court, however, relying
on Short, was especially concerned about the ease with which the Gov-
ernment could, through artful pleading, avoid the defendant's double
jeopardy protection. Conspiracy raises special problems.' 32 The essence
of the crime is an agreement to violate the law, and it would be all too
easy to convert a single agreement into two by alleging different conspira-
tors, overt acts, dates, and places. The same agreement may be shown by
different aggregations of proof concerning individuals and overt acts. 133
Without explicitly saying so, the court held that the conspiracy's "unit of
prosecution" was larger than the Government's indictment would sug-
gest.134 Unfortunately, the court gave no clear guidance on a positive
note.
The court set forth no clear test for determining, for double jeopardy
purposes, whether there was one conspiracy or many; instead, the court
relied on Kotteakos. The court chastised the Government for urging such
a narrow approach in a double jeopardy context when, in cases with simi-
lar facts, 135 it had argued for a broad view of Kotteakos in order to uphold
joint trials of large numbers of conspirators. The court asked whether it
would have approved, consistent with Koneakos, a single trial concerning
all the co-conspirators and all the overt acts identified in both indict-
ments.136 If such a hypothetical joint trial would be permissible, then the
defendant may successfully assert a double jeopardy defense. 137
130. Because the Government failed to satisfy the traditional test, Mallah found it un-
necessary to adopt a broad policy of fairness akin to the civil law doctrines of res judicata
and issue preclusion, id. at 985 n.7, as concurring opinions of Justice Brennan advocated in
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-50 (1970), and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187,
196 (1959).
131. The Supreme Court, validating the almost unanimous opinion of the lower courts,
has since conclusively determined that in narcotics conspiracies there is no requirement of
an overt act. United States v. Shabani, 115 S. Ct. 382 (1994); see also supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
132. Mallah, 503 F.2d at 985.
133. Accord United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1188 (4th Cir. 1988).
134. Id.
135. E.g., United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 982-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
926 (1973); accord United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337, 1345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1008 (1974); United States v. Arroyo, 494 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 827 (1974); United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
136. Mallah, 503 F.2d at 983.
137. In evaluating the double jeopardy claim, the court may look not only at the indict-
ments, but also at the transcript of the previous trial. E.g., United States v. Puckett, 692
F.2d 663, 667 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982). It may also consider testimony
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Mallah was very much a product of Kotteakos. Rather than focusing on
the variance and double jeopardy problems raised by the defendant as-
serting the double jeopardy defense, Mallah focused on the conspirators
as a group.138 If severance of peripheral members in a hypothetical joint
trial would have been necessary, then Pacelli would have had no double
jeopardy defense. Mallah carried forward the Kotteakos notion that a
course of conduct is either one conspiracy or many, and that its nature is
in no way dependent on the vantage point from which it is viewed. 139
Since Mallah saw double jeopardy and variance as two sides of the same
coin, Mallah did not consider (nor was it forced to consider) the possibil-
ity that the charged conspiracies might be both separate conspiracies
under Kotteakos and a single conspiracy for the purpose of Pacelli's
double jeopardy argument.1 40
Mallah made new law on a procedural level, and the Second Circuit
failed to appreciate fully the novelty of its decision. Historically, the de-
fendant had the burden of proof on the double jeopardy issue, and the
cases did not draw a fine distinction between the burden of going forward
with the evidence and the burden of persuasion.141 Mallah split the two
burdens, placing the risk of non-persuasion on the government once the
defendant raised enough evidence to put the issue into play.142 Mallah
did not make clear what the defendant would have to show in order to
shift the burden to the prosecution. (Later cases have stated the defend-
ant must make a non-frivolous showing, which is not more informa-
and investigative reports. United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1258 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984). The Government may also submit materials in camera and ex
parte when the issues are litigated before trial of the general issue. United States v. Strick-
lin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). Since this procedure is
meant to protect the Government from pre-trial discovery that would not normally be
available, it should be available only when the double jeopardy issue is litigated on a pre-
trial basis. Obviously, if the defendant has the right to trial by jury before trial of the
general issue, the Government can hardly be making ex parte submissions. See authorities
cited supra note 114-15 and accompanying text.
138. Accord United States v. Thomas, 759 F.2d 659, 667 (8th Cir. 1985).
139. Kotteakos has played a similarly dominant role in the other circuits. E.g., United
States v. Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1978).
140. Mallah pointedly noted that the Government could exact significant punishment
on Pacelli by charging him with multiple substantive offenses. 503 F.2d at 987.
141. E.g., Kastel v. United States, 23 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1927) ("[Tlhe defendant has
the burden of proof, and must make out his case."), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 604 (1928).
142. It is unclear what should be the standard of review on appeal: a de novo review or
review under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Mintz, 16 F.3d 1101, 1104
(10th Cir.) (de novo, but underlying factual findings reviewed under a clearly erroneous
test), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2760 (1994); United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 669 (5th
Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Okolie, 3 F.3d 287, 289 (8th Cir. 1993) (de novo), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1203 (1994); United States v. Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 923, 926 (3d Cir. 1988)
(plenary review); Puckett, 692 F.2d at 668 (clearly erroneous); United States v. Beszborn,
21 F.3d 62, 69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 330 (1994) (reversing dismissal, apparently
on a de novo review); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 797 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (6th Cir. 1986)
(clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). It is uncertain whether the standard
of review for an interlocutory review should be different from the standard of review after
a full trial. United States v. Bendis, 681 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973
(1982).
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tive. 143 ) Mallah merely held that, given the overlap in time and place
between the two indictments, Pacelli had satisfied his burden of going
forward with the evidence on the double jeopardy issue, and that the
Government did not satisfy its burden of establishing that there were two
separate conspiracies. 1' The court suggested that "the element of time
will be of considerable importance."'1 45 It is tempting to read into this
remark that continuing illegal behavior over a course of time will trans-
late into a single conspiracy-or at least it will shift the burden to the
government. The court also suggested that a narcotics conspiracy is more
likely to be a single conspiracy and that defendants in non-narcotics cases
would have a higher burden.146 But the court also suggested, as its later
decisions have amply born out,147 that even a drug dealer can be in more
than one conspiracy.
Decisions in other circuits have also held that the Government should
have the ultimate burden. 148 This burden is said to be especially appro-
priate when the defense is considered before trial,149 since the Govern-
ment has a greater knowledge of the facts and circumstances leading to
the successive indictments.'50 (Mallah was a review after a full trial on
the second indictment. 51)
143. E.g., Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1118.
144. The Government's burden is by the preponderance of the evidence. See Ragins,
840 F.2d at 1192; United States v. Liotard, 817 F.2d 1074, 1077 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 797 F.2d at 1380; Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1119.
145. Mallah, 503 F.2d at 986.
146. Id. at 987.
147. E.g., United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961
(1976).
148. United States v. Thornton, 972 F.2d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mc-
Han, 966 F.2d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Benefield, 874 F.2d 1503, 1505
(11th Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 797 F.2d at 1380; United States v. Booth,
673 F.2d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Bendis, 681 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982); Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1118; Tercero, 580 F.2d at 315
n.12; United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 329-32 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 859
(1979). Contra Mintz, 16 F.3d at 1104; United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1060 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 933 (1995) (Government has burden pre-trial, but defendant
has burden after full trial).
149. Considered from a historical perspective, this argument is incoherent since the de-
fendant always raised his double jeopardy defense before trial and was entitled to a jury
determination of his defense before the prosecution was allowed to present its case. See
authorities cited supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
150. United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1981); Stricklin, 591 F.2d at
1118; Inmon, 568 F.2d at 329-32.
To some extent, this assessment is correct. Some defendants, however, may have better
access to the relevant evidence. If, for example, a defendant testifies that he has been
continuously involved in selling drugs, that he regards it as his business, and that he takes
every opportunity to sell drugs, he has presented powerful evidence that he has been in a
single, continuous drug conspiracy, especially if he is major player in the drug trade.
Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1064. His testimony may be subject to limited immunity. Ragins, 840
F.2d at 1193; United States v. Bounos, 693 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1982); Stricklin, 591 F.2d at
1118; Inmon, 568 F.2d at 333.
151. A defendant may raise and litigate his double jeopardy claim before trial of the
general issue. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). If his claim is denied, then he
may take an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 662. Notwithstanding the district court's initial
ruling or the appellate ruling on the interlocutory appeal, the district court may reconsider
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While Kotteakos helped the defendant in Mallah, tying the double
jeopardy defense to Kotteakos defeated the defense in United States v.
Papa.152 The court found that Papa was the head of two separate narcot-
ics conspiracies. Because all his co-conspirators could not, consistent
with Kotteakos, be tried at one time for one conspiracy, Papa could be
tried twice for the two conspiracies. 153 Although the court's conclusion
that there were two conspiracies is questionable even as measured by
Kotteakos, the more significant aspect of Papa is that the co-conspirators'
right to a severance affected Papa's double jeopardy rights. Since the co-
conspirators had a Kotteakos right to a severance, Papa, a core conspira-
tor, had no double jeopardy rights. The court never considered that vari-
ance analysis might be only the first step and that the defendant might
have a double jeopardy defense under the broader approach illustrated in
Snow and Short.
A later case, United States v. Abbamonte, 54 summarized the relation-
ship between variance and double jeopardy as developed in the Second
Circuit under the influence of Kotteakos:
Whether a defendant's criminal activities establish his participation
in one large conspiracy or two separate conspiracies is an issue on
which prosecutors and defense counsel have often changed positions
"as nimbly as if dancing a quadrille." When a defendant challenges a
conviction on the ground of variance, he urges that, though the in-
dictment alleged one conspiracy, the evidence showed at least two;
the Government contends there was only one conspiracy. However,
when a defendant challenges a conviction on the ground of double
jeopardy, or, as here, seeks to avoid trial on that ground, he contends
that only one conspiracy exists, while the Government insists there
are at least two.155
the double jeopardy defense on the basis of all the evidence heard during the second trial,
the pre-trial decision not being binding on the defendant. Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1119.
This approach is entirely ahistorical, since the defendant was expected to litigate his
double jeopardy claim before trial of the general issue and could not take an interlocutory
appeal of an adverse ruling. Although the defendant is still expected to raise his double
jeopardy defense before trial, courts have allowed it to be raised for the first time during
the trial. United States v. Young, 503 F.2d 1072, 1074 (3d Cir. 1974).
152. 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976).
153. Id. at 822. The court relied on its recent holding in United States v. Bertolotti, 529
F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1975).
154. 759 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, United States v. Del Vecchio, 800 F.2d 21 (2d
Cir. 1986), overruled by United States v. Macchia, 41 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1994).
155. Id. at 1068 (citations omitted); accord Thornton, 972 F.2d at 770; United States v.
Thomas, 759 F.2d 659, 667 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985); Stricklin, 591 F.2d at 1121.
In Abbamonte, the court noted the seemingly inconsistent positions taken by the Gov-
ernment (and also by the defense bar) as the context changed from variance to double
jeopardy. The court forgot that, although variance doctrine often aids a double jeopardy
defense, it does not necessarily defeat the defense. See 759 F.2d at 1065.
Much more disturbing are the often inconsistent results reached by the courts. Facts
upon which a defendant could not be acquitted for variance or could not receive a multiple
conspiracy instruction sometimes produce a finding that there are multiple conspiracies for
double jeopardy purposes. Compare United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512, 1521-23 (2d
Cir. 1992) with United States v. Macchia, 35 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 1994). To some extent, these
anomalies can be papered over by asserting that the existence of multiple conspiracies is a
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Abbamonte, although applying Mallah to uphold the defense, observed
that, "[t]he distinctions drawn in Mallah and Papa are not wholly satisfac-
tory."'1 56 This observation was a premonition of a later development. 157
United States v. Korfant 58 represents a significant break from Mallah
and Papa. The short per curiam opinion in Korfant did not purport to
overrule or modify prior Second Circuit cases; indeed, it cited all the Sec-
ond Circuit cases in support of its result and implied that Korfant was
merely an outgrowth of Mallah and other cases following Mallah. But
Korfant's method is remarkably different from these earlier cases.
Korfant set out a list of eight factors to determine whether a conspiracy
conviction was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause:
In determining the merits of double jeopardy claims arising in the
context of successive conspiracy prosecutions, this court has identi-
fied a number of factors as relevant to the task of individuating con-
spiracies. Among these factors are (1) the criminal offenses charged
in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of participants; (3) the
overlap of time; (4) similarity of operation; (5) the existence of com-
mon overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged conspiracies
or location where overt acts occurred; (7) common objectives; and
(8) the degree of interdependence between alleged distinct
conspiracies. 159
On this basis the court came to the conclusion that the executive of a
national grocery chain engaged in several conspiracies with his competi-
tors in separate local markets to fix prices, even though the alleged con-
spiracies overlapped in time.160 It would seem reasonably clear that
fact issue. E.g., United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
American Honda Motor Corp., 273 F. Supp. 810, 816 (N.D. I11. 967). But when on a set of
given facts, a defendant would not even be entitled to a multiple conspiracy instruction, the
defendant with materially the same facts should obtain double jeopardy protection.
156. 759 F.2d at 1069. Other representative Second Circuit cases from the Mallah era
are United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1232-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920
(1979), and United States v. Bommarito, 524 F.2d 140, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1975).
157. See infra notes 158-61.
158. 771 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1985).
159. Id. at 662. The other circuits have also adopted a multi-factor analysis, employing
many of the same factors. E.g., United States v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 69 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 330 (1994); United States v. Nyhuis, 8 F.3d 731, 736 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 56 (1994); United States v. Jarvis, 7 F.3d 404, 410-11 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1200 (1994); United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Guzman, 852 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Liotard, 817
F.2d 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1256 (6th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1982) (alternate holding); United
States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 978 (1982); United States v.
Tercero, 580 F.2d 312, 316 (8th Cir. 1978).
When allegedly separate RICO conspiracies are tested under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, additional factors are the similarity of the alleged RICO enterprises and the pat-
terns of racketeering. United States v. Salerno, 964 F.2d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 923, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Langella, 804
F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Ruggiero, 754 F.2d 927 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985); United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1257 (6th Cir. 1983).
160. Korfant, 771 F.2d at 663. The court acknowledged that Korfant's co-workers were
involved in Korfant's activities on an ongoing basis, but argued that the antitrust conspir-
acy statute under which Korfant was prosecuted criminalized Korfant's agreement only as
19961
SMU LAW REVIEW
Korfant had a continuous course of conduct of agreeing with others to fix
prices. Conspirators may have come and gone, but his agreement contin-
ued over the years.
The trouble with Korfant is that it did not make clear how these factors
relate to each other or to the overall inquiry. The court's evaluation of
these factors seemed to break away from the variance test of Kotteakos
but was not tied to any discernible test. More importantly, Korfant
seemed to focus on the differences between the two indictments, without
acknowledging that these differences are usually immaterial as a matter
of substantive conspiracy law. The court in Korfant seemed to forget that
the unit of prosecution is the agreement and that the "factors" are merely
evidentiary detail. Although Korfant was presented as a distillation of
prior cases, its methodology was different from these prior cases, and this
difference has become more pronounced in the court's later
applications. 161
In United States v. Calderone,162 the Second Circuit considered whether
its Korfant jurisprudence was still good law after Grady v. Corbin.163
Calderone was prosecuted in an indictment that alleged multiple events,
actors, and types of drugs. The court entered a finding of not guilty at the
close of the Government's case and expressed the view that Calderone
had entered a conspiracy, but not the large conspiracy alleged in the in-
dictment. The district judge apparently relied on Kotteakos and did not
consider the effect of Miller. Perhaps under Kotteakos the court should
have granted a severance to Calderone, which would have had the effect
of declaring a mistrial and allowing a retrial. 164 In any event, the court
entered a finding of not guilty. 65 The Government then recharged
Calderone in a smaller conspiracy that encompassed only the evidence
presented as to Calderone at the first trial. 166
it involved competitors. Id. This distinction was valid, but only in an obvious sense, and
did not convincingly answer Korfant's argument. His competitor-conspirators may have
come and gone, but he was in a single conspiracy with his competitor-conspirators.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Reiter, 848 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1988).
162. 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir, 1990).
163. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
164. Unless there has been prosecutorial overreaching, a defendant's request for a mis-
trial allows retrial consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause. Eg., Ball v. United States,
163 U.S. 662 (1896).
165. Calderone, 917 F.2d at 718-19 (quoting the district court's remarks in granting a
judgment of acquittal).
166. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit made clear that the ear-
lier dismissal was a true acquittal, which bars reprosecution for the same offense, and not a
dismissal of the sort that would allow re-trial for the same offense. Calderone, 982 F.2d at
44 (relying on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)).
Although some earlier cases (e.g., United States v. Wills, 36 F.2d 855 (3d Cir. 1929)) had
taken the different view that a dismissal for variance is not an acquittal for double jeopardy
purposes, these cases never represented the weight of the law, see FRIEDLAND, supra note
10, at 65-69, and have been put to rest by Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75-78
(1978).
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The Second Circuit refused to apply Korfant and held that it was bound
by Grady,'167 which it read to have displaced the Korfant analysis. Since
Calderone had been tried on various events, those same events could not
be used to establish his guilt in a second trial. The court perceptively
noted that, although the crime of conspiracy is an agreement, the agree-
ment is proved by what was said and done, not by formal recitations of an
agreement. 168 If events A, B, and C have already led to acquittal (or
conviction) of a conspiracy, those same events may not be used to estab-
lish an allegedly separate agreement. Under this application of Grady,
the Korfant factors and the Kotteakos test were irrelevant.
Ironically, the court did not seem to realize that Grady could leave
significant opportunities for the government to prosecute multiple times
for the same conspiracy. If the government can present new and addi-
tional conduct each time, it can engage in multiple prosecutions for what
might be considered a single conspiracy under Kotteakos. On the facts of
Calderone, this abuse was not possible, since the first trial had involved
such a large and multi-faceted conspiracy, and it was beyond dispute that
Calderone was involved in one small episode.
The Government sought review in Calderone and in a similar case,
United States v. Gambino.169 The Supreme Court remanded both cases
without opinion 170 for further consideration in light of its recent decision
in United States v. Felix.171 The Second Circuit, on remand in Gambino
(Gambino I/),172 believed that Felix did not provide direct guidance, since
Felix involved multiple prosecutions under different statutes, not multiple
prosecutions under the same statute. 173 Gambino II concluded, however,
that Felix warranted a return to the Korfant test and an abandonment of
its prior opinion in Calderone:174 According to the Second Circuit, Felix
emphasized that the crime is the agreement, not the conduct from which
the agreement may be inferred. 175 In fact, the Supreme Court stated in
Felix that it did not wish to resolve the perceived dichotomy between the
agreement and its proof.176 The Second Circuit thought that a return to
Korfant would be truer to Felix, since Korfant focused more on the agree-
ment itself, whereas Grady focused solely on evidentiary details.' 77
167. Grady, 495 U.S. at 508.
168. Calderone, 917 F.2d at 721.
169. 920 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd and remanded, 503 U.S. 978 (1992), new opinion
at, 968 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1992).
170. 503 U.S. 978 (1992).
171. 503 U.S. 378 (1992).
172. United States v. Gambino, 968 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1992).
173. Id. at 231.
174. Id. at 232.
175. Id. at 231.
176. Felix, 503 U.S. at 391-92.
177. Gambino, 968 F.2d at 231. Although Grady would seem to focus on the eviden-
tiary details, it is questionable that Korfant focuses on the agreement, as opposed to the
evidentiary details. Korfant represents an unfocused examination of various factors, and
there appears to be little emphasis in the Korfant opinion upon the essential act of agree-
ment. Indeed, in its own way, Korfant seems to focus more on evidentiary details, than on
the act of agreement.
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Having returned to Korfant, the Second Circuit, on remand in Calder-
one (Calderone I),178 observed that the Korfant analysis has a major defi-
ciency. Under Korfant it is not clear whether a court "is to be influenced
primarily by the extent to which the relevant facts pertinent to each fac-
tor overlap or by the extent to which they are distinct."'1 79 Although con-
spiracy opinions have consistently criticized the metaphorical allusions to
conspiracies as either chains or circles180 (a development inspired by Kot-
teakos), Calderone II introduced another geometric metaphor to analyze
this inherently abstract problem:
Or, if the issue is thought of in geometric terms with the two conspir-
acies thought of as intersecting circles, is the emphasis on the extent
of the area common to both circles or the extent of the area of each
circle outside of the common area? For example, nearly all the facts
relevant to a small conspiracy might be located within the "circle" of
a large conspiracy, with the facts relevant to only one factor (for ex-
ample, time) extending slightly outside the larger circle, yet the
larger conspiracy might also encompass numerous facts outside the
circle of the smaller conspiracy. If degree of commonality is impor-
tant, the smaller conspiracy may be viewed as simply a part of the
larger conspiracy, but if degree of difference is important, the numer-
ous facts of the larger conspiracy not common to the smaller conspir-
acy would lead to a conclusion of separate conspiracies.' 8 '
The circles described in Calderone II do not equate with the circle, or
wheel, described in Kotteakos.182 In Kotteakos, a conspiracy might or
might not be a wheel, with alternate consequences flowing from that find-
ing. In Calderone II, every conspiracy is conceptualized as a circle, and
that circle is compared for "overlap" with another circle representing the
allegedly separate conspiracy. 183 Calderone II does carry forward, how-
ever, the assumption in Kotteakos that a conspiracy is one or many in an
objective sense and not relative as to any one conspirator.
After an extensive analysis of Second Circuit precedent, the Calderone
I court concluded that its decisions established the following pattern:
[W]e have held conspiracies to be different where the facts of a
smaller conspiracy, pertinent to some Korfant factors, such as time
and geography, were wholly contained within a larger conspiracy so
long as there were sufficient factors that shared only a slight overlap
of facts or none at all. Where the facts of the smaller conspiracy
were substantially overlapping with those of the larger conspiracy,
we have either held the conspiracies to be the same, as in Mallah, or
178. United States v. Calderone, 982 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1992).
179. Id. at 45.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.).
Kotteakos makes no reference to "chain" conspiracies, a description that probably
originated in United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921, 922 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
181. 982 F.2d at 45-46.
182. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755 (1946).
183. 982 F.2d at 45-46.
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sufficiently similar to require the Government to prove that they are
different, as in Abbamonte.184
Viewed in this light, Calderone was an easy case under an application of
the Korfant factors. "The pending case appears to be the first one to have
reached this Court in which all of the facts pertinent to an identification
of a conspiracy are wholly contained within a previously prosecuted con-
spiracy. 1 85 The court upheld the double jeopardy defense once again, as
it had under a Grady analysis, but it left completely unanswered what
should be done with a case that did not have the unique facts of
Calderone.186
Implicit in this approach was that had the "smaller" conspiracy been
tried first, double jeopardy would bar a prosecution for the "larger" con-
spiracy. 187 But the court in Calderone H did leave open whether such a
prosecution might be permissible if at the time of the first prosecution the
Government was unaware of the larger conspiracy. 188 Ironically, this "es-
cape valve" for the Government seems related to the res judicata doc-
trine found in civil cases, 189 even though the Supreme Court has
consistently and stoutly refused to accept that civil res judicata doctrine
can be of any use in the double jeopardy context. 190
Calderone II's emphasis on drawing circles is entirely misplaced, just as
Korfant's emphasis on multiple factors is also misplaced, unless the exer-
cise is viewed as a means to an end. The end is the determination of
whether a defendant entered into one conspiracy or many. Whether
there is one conspiracy or many depends on the essential nature of con-
spiracy as a continuing offense. Since conspiracy is a continuing offense,
there is a presumption that once a defendant enters into a conspiracy, his
offense continues, and he does not form new conspiracies each time he
breaks the law, even though his accomplices may change. The Korfant
factors may throw light on this inquiry, but they are subsidiary to the
ultimate issue.
Calderone II is equally troublesome in carrying forward the assumption
of Kotteakos that a conspiracy is a group of persons, as opposed to an
184. Id. at 47.
185. Id.
186. One could easily conceive of a situation in which there might be a total overlap as
to time but a very small overlap as to place or as to co-conspirators. Calderone gave no
hint as to how any of these many permutations should be resolved.
187. If the two allegedly separate conspiracies have a sufficiently high degree of overlap
on all the key factors, it should make no difference which one is tried first. If they have this
sufficient degree of overlap, they are really a single conspiracy, and the defendant should
have the same protection regardless of which is tried first. Gambino, 968 F.2d at 227.
188. 982 F.2d at 48. Cf. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977) (relying on Diaz v.
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912)). If the extent of the defendant's involvement is
the undiscovered crime, this exception might not apply. United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d
1184, 1193 (4th Cir. 1988).
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. j (1982).
190. Most notably, the Court has always refused to adopt a "same transaction" test,
which, like its civil counterpart, would require the Government (the plaintiff) to join in a
single indictment all offenses arising from a single transaction. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S.
508, 523 n.15 (1990).
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agreement. 191 If conspiracy is viewed as an agreement, then the focus
will be on each conspirator's agreement, not on the existence or composi-
tion of a group of persons.192
The mischief implicit in Calderone II bore full fruit in United States v.
Macchia.193 Certain individuals were prosecuted for conspiracy to avoid
payment of gasoline excise taxes. Two of these defendants were then in-
dicted for a second conspiracy with the same objective, but one with a
larger scope. The Second Circuit candidly admitted that there was an
overlap between the two indictments on a number of factors and that the
first conspiracy could have been pleaded as part of the conspiracy alleged
in the second indictment.' 94 One of the two defendants raising the
double jeopardy defense was said to control one hundred percent of the
bootleg gasoline market in the New York City area during the time frame
covered by the two indictments. Yet the court found this individual had
no double jeopardy defense. 195
Each of the Korfant factors was examined. 196 Most were found to
overlap, but the overlap was not considered significant, since the factors
were not significant in themselves.' 97 That these facts had little signifi-
cance is true, but Macchia turned this wisdom on its head by asserting
that this insignificance could defeat the double jeopardy defense.
Instead, Macchia looked at the two alleged conspiracies and found that
the common actors in the two conspiracies played different roles.' 98 Mac-
chia thought this difference was significant, although no prior case had
ever focused on the different roles played by the same conspirators in
allegedly different conspiracies as a separate Korfant factor.199 In effect,
the court created a ninth Korfant factor.200
191. A number of cases proceed on this same premise, often implicitly. See, e.g., United
States v. Guzman, 852 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. MacDougall, 790
F.2d 1135, 1147 (4th Cir. 1986).
192. Cases do find double jeopardy even when they examine the agreement in general,
not the agreement of the defendant raising the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Jarvis, 7
F.3d 404, 412 (4th Cir. 1993).
193. 35 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 1994).
194. Id. at 668.
195. Id. at 672.
196. Id. at 668-72.
197. Id. at 669-71.
198. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 668.
199. Cases sustaining a double jeopardy defense have observed that the defendant was
a core member in both cases, e.g., United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 986 (2d Cir. 1974),
or played the same role in both cases, e.g., United States v. Liotard, 817 F.2d 1074, 1079 (3d
Cir. 1987). Macchia is, therefore, consistent with the implication that a defendant's role in
the two conspiracies is important, although all conspirators are equally guilty of the crime,
regardless of the role they play in the offense.
Of course, any discussion of who is a core member presupposes that a conspiracy is a
group. If a conspiracy is agreement, then a person has agreed or not agreed. His core
membership is irrelevant.
200. "Coreness" implies that a conspiracy is a group of persons, not a defendant's
agreement. To that extent, Macchia continues the virtually unexamined assumption of
Kotteakos.
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Finally, the Macchia court asserted that the success of one conspiracy
was not dependent on the success of the other.201 This type of inquiry
assumes that there are separate conspiracies, the very issue to be decided.
The inquiry ignores that a conspiracy may move from one illegal episode
to another, regardless of success, without becoming a separate conspir-
acy.20 2 In fact, failure of a criminal episode may sometimes cause the
conspirators to look for a new opportunity, but success can also instigate
new offenses. As the cases repeatedly teach, success or failure is neutral
to the offense of conspiracy. 20 3 There is no reason why success or failure
should establish the boundaries between one conspiracy or the other
when success or failure is irrelevant to-or at least an unpredictable fac-
tor in-the existence or the continuation of a conspiracy.
All in all, Macchia expressed continued concern that the government
would be able to defeat a defendant's double jeopardy protection by
manipulating the terms of the indictment.2 04 This well-founded and well-
intentioned concern would seem to lend little practical protection for the
defendant if the court insists upon analyzing the issue under the terms it
has chosen.205
Macchia, although it ignored Kotteakos, continued the unspoken prem-
ise of Kotteakos that a conspiracy is a monolithic construct not dependent
on any one conspirator's vantage point.206 Macchia took this premise to
201. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 671; accord United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1063 (7th Cir.
1993) (stating that whether the two conspiracies depended on each other for success is the
factor traditionally given most attention).
202. See United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 861 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1074 (1991); United States v. Kalish, 690 F.2d 1144, 1151 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1108 (1983).
203. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975).
204. Chief Judge Newman, concurring, stressed that the Government had barely man-
aged to prevail at the pre-trial stage and that the "[G]overnment would be well advised not
to take rejection of the defense in this case as an invitation to make a regular practice of
prosecuting the same defendants for larger conspiracies after concluding that sentencing
on a smaller conspiracy was inadequate." Macchia, 35 F.3d at 673.
205. In United States v. Aracri, 968 F.2d 1512 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit had
little difficulty in rejecting a multiple conspiracy argument, but in the context of variance,
not double jeopardy, on facts that are not convincingly different from the facts presented in
Macchia. Aracri pointed out that a single conspiracy is not transposed into a multiple
conspiracy simply by lapse of time, change in membership, or a shifting emphasis on its
locale of operations. Id. at 1521. Instead of separate conspiracies, the court viewed this as
a case involving different phases of a single continuing conspiracy. Id at 1522.
Nevertheless, double jeopardy, even after Macchia, can be a viable defense. See United
States v. McGowan, 854 F.2d 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 58 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1995).
206. Even when a court focuses on conspiracy as an agreement, not as a group of peo-
ple, it may still deny a double jeopardy defense. The Seventh Circuit has held that two of
the defendants were in a single agreement with each other to distribute cocaine, but they
lacked double jeopardy protection, since, as a partnership, they joined other, multiple con-
spiracies to distribute cocaine. Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1063. No other reported case seems to
have taken an approach of this sort. The Seventh Circuit, no doubt influenced by its
landmark decision in United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1991), was com-
pelled to view conspiracy as each defendant's agreement, not his membership in a group.
That approach would give fairly broad double jeopardy protection. But the court managed
to escape the confines of Townsend by suggesting that a partnership-which is a conspir-
acy-can itself be a party to a separate conspiratorial agreement.
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an extreme by declaring that a person who had one hundred percent con-
trol of all illegal gasoline in the New York City area entered into separate
conspiracies, since co-conspirators came and went and even those who
stayed played different roles at different times. 20 7 The court gave no ex-
planation as to why it did not pursue the much more likely alternative:
that this key player was in a single conspiracy whose co-conspirators
came and went, or waxed and waned in their responsibilities, as often
happens in large-scale, enduring criminal endeavors.208
VI. CONCLUSION
In the double jeopardy context, the courts have not been consistent in
following the doctrine that conspiracy is a continuing offense and in ac-
cepting all the logical conclusions associated with that doctrine. Since
conspiracy is a continuing offense, there is no reason to believe, absent
compelling evidence, that a defendant has exited one conspiracy and en-
tered another.209 That he has different co-conspirators at various times is
a very weak indicator that he has moved from one conspiracy to another;
instead, it merely indicates that new co-conspirators have joined his
agreement. 210 Given the nature of drug conspiracies, where this question
most often arises, the double jeopardy defense should be rarely rejected.
More generally, whenever a defendant repeatedly commits crimes of the
same general nature, it is highly probable that he is in a single conspiracy.
The multi-factor analysis-which has been universally adopted-is not
tied to any standard. None of the factors deemed important in this analy-
sis go to the material element of the offense, the defendant's agreement.
It makes little sense to assess the overlap between two cases on these
multiple factors when these factors are not elements of the offense and
are merely evidentiary of the element of agreement. This concept is the
basic teaching of Short, a case that all others profess to follow, but which,
as demonstrated, has been turned on its head.
The courts have failed to acknowledge fully that the variance doctrine
has changed so substantially that it should not control double jeopardy
inquiries in conspiracy cases. It makes little sense to compare conspiracy
207. Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669.
208. An equally unusual approach is found in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 797 F.2d
1377, 1384-85 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), in which the Sixth Circuit distin-
guished between "parent" and "offspring" conspiracies. If the parent conspiracy is active,
then prosecution for either conspiracy bars prosecution for the other. If, however, the
parent conspiracy is "passive," then prosecution of one offspring conspiracy does not bar
prosecution of another offspring conspiracy. Nonetheless, prosecution of one of the off-
spring conspiracies would bar prosecution of the passive parent conspiracy. Id. By failing
to examine a defendant's agreement from that defendant's perspective, the court has en-
meshed itself in all sorts of pseudo-philosophical inquiries that have no real meaning and
no basis in precedent.
209. See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910).
210. E.g., United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Bryan, 896 F.2d 68, 71-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847 (1990); United States v.
Benefield, 874 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456, 464
(7th Cir. 1980).
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indictments for their allegations of times, places, and actions when those
allegations do not significantly limit the government's proof.
The courts have correctly placed on the prosecution the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion on the double jeopardy issue. Since conspiracy is a
continuing offense, once the defendant establishes a prior prosecution,
the government should be required to prove that its new prosecution is
for a different conspiracy. In doing so, the prosecution may point to dis-
similarities, e.g., time, place, and accomplices, but those dissimilarities
should be assessed against the rich legal background that says those dis-
similarities are usually of no consequence.
The courts should especially consider and apply the numerous prece-
dents that as a matter of law deny defendants jury instructions on multiple
conspiracies. 211 If a defendant, under the liberal standard for obtaining a
jury instruction,212 cannot obtain a multiple conspiracy instruction on a
given set of facts, then the government should not be able to bring two
prosecutions on essentially the same set of facts. When a court has de-
clared specific changes in personnel, places, or overt acts are so inconse-
quential that a jury may not even think about multiple conspiracies, it can
have no principled basis for declaring that on essentially similar facts a
defendant must endure separate trials and punishments.
Drawing circles and comparing the degree of overlap between those
circles will not provide meaningful answers. And the true inquiry must
never be lost: Did the defendant enter one essential agreement or two?
That question has become lost in the thicket of Korfant factors, which
yield unpredictable results.
211. See cases cited supra note 99.
212. E.g., United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendant enti-
tled to instruction if it has some foundation in the evidence, however tenuous).
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